From 75c609ded699b5b9e16b8e28421697df255f6944 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ex_tianzy Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:21:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix(work): fence repeated approval intents and audit state changes atomically --- deployable/APPROVAL_LOCAL_20261117.md | 4 + deployable/M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md | 43 +++++++ deployable/M6_FIX_TEST_DEPLOY_20261117.md | 60 +++++++++ .../M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md | 74 +++++++++++ deployable/relay/approval_api.py | 3 + deployable/relay/approval_audit.py | 40 ++++++ deployable/relay/approval_policy.py | 3 +- deployable/relay/approval_store.py | 89 ++++++++++++- deployable/relay/approval_worker.py | 2 +- deployable/relay/config.py | 7 ++ deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py | 10 +- deployable/tests/test_approval_audit.py | 119 ++++++++++++++++++ deployable/tests/test_approval_postgres.py | 109 ++++++++++++++++ .../tests/test_approval_security_review.py | 62 +++++++++ deployable/tests/test_broker_deploy.py | 23 ++++ 15 files changed, 638 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 deployable/M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md create mode 100644 deployable/M6_FIX_TEST_DEPLOY_20261117.md create mode 100644 deployable/M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md create mode 100644 deployable/relay/approval_audit.py create mode 100644 deployable/tests/test_approval_audit.py create mode 100644 deployable/tests/test_approval_postgres.py create mode 100644 deployable/tests/test_approval_security_review.py diff --git a/deployable/APPROVAL_LOCAL_20261117.md b/deployable/APPROVAL_LOCAL_20261117.md index 9e39452..171926c 100644 --- a/deployable/APPROVAL_LOCAL_20261117.md +++ b/deployable/APPROVAL_LOCAL_20261117.md @@ -35,3 +35,7 @@ approval_worker.py使用专用单线程及该线程独享的数据库连接, 测试XML:deployable/build-support/approval-integration-20261117.xml。成对源码可通过HAINUO_APPROVAL_PC_SOURCE指定客户端仓库根目录;缺少时明确skip,不能将缺少跨仓执行当通过。独立PostgreSQL用例因未提供测试地址仍跳过;完整服务重启、SDK三秒响应、手机UI显示及真实平台回调需后续隔离环境验收。不能据此标记C201—C204全部完成或可上线。 最终本轮ECS/联合回归100项通过、1项跳过,客户端62项通过(合计162通过、1跳过);详细范围与复现见APPROVAL_ACCEPTANCE_LOCAL_20261117.md。没有提交、推送、部署或出包。 + +后续M6本地增量:用户暂停手机现场测试后,明确继续M6开发。本轮补C207最小审计、事务失败不放行、默认关闭的保留/清理策略及独立PostgreSQL竞争用例。组合回归192通过2跳过;清理游标最终调整专项另核。详见M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md。本轮代码未部署,不能将新审计能力写成现网已启用。 + +后续独立安全复核与真实PG验证:复现并修复同任务换操作ID重复申请、确认目标不明确/被截断两类问题。隔离本机PostgreSQL 17.7下执行4/16连接竞争、决定冲突、真实SQL审计失败回滚及不同ID同意图竞争,临时实例已停止。最终组合205项通过0跳过,取代本轮“PG缺地址”的未验证状态,但不代表ECS现场或手机验收。详见M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md;修复仍是本地未提交源码,未部署。 diff --git a/deployable/M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md b/deployable/M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa85ab1 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployable/M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +# M6审批审计与保留开发记录 + +日期:2026-11-17。范围:C207及C201至C204的本地回归。手机现场验收继续暂缓,线上服务仍为之前部署的03d34f1,本次没有部署、推送、出包或修改本机已安装Work组件。 + +## 本轮实现 + +增加work_approval_audit_v1,记录创建、允许、拒绝、许可消费、过期、取消、卡片绑定、发送结果不明及内容清理。审计写入与对应状态修改使用同一数据库事务;写审计失败即撤回该事务,不下发许可。重复回调/重复消费不会生成第二次决定或消费事件。 + +审计字段仅含环境/应用、审批引用、任务/本人/设备的作用域摘要、绑定代次、动作摘要、固定动作类别、事件、状态及记录时间。不保存动作请求正文、卡片文案、账号姓名、原始用户/设备ID、访问/刷新令牌或按钮nonce。摘要是关联标识,不宣称不可重识别。审计中的consumed仅代表执行许可已消费,不代表业务已成功;业务结果仍由原任务和操作记录核对。 + +没有新增公开的审计查询、任意SQL或管理员执行接口;无效回调在原校验边界拒绝,本轮未增加未经验证操作者的身份审计。 + +## 保留与清理候选 + +| 配置 | 候选默认 | 行为 | +| --- | --- | --- | +| HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED | false | 未评审前不启用后台清理 | +| HN_APPROVAL_PAYLOAD_RETENTION_DAYS | 30 | 已关闭审批的加密动作/文案/nonce及对应密钥引用到期后清空 | +| HN_APPROVAL_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS | 90 | 已清理审批的过期审计事件有限删除 | + +30/90天只是研发候选值,应按团队正式留存要求评审,不作为公司合规期限。要求1 <= 内容保留天数 <= 审计保留天数 <= 365;启用清理还要求审批功能已开启。现有部署配置未被修改,部署脚本也未新增自动开启清理的参数。 + +只选择当前应用/环境内rejected、expired、cancelled、consumed审批;pending/approved不清。consumed但原任务仍inflight、unknown或已查不到任务时不清,保留恢复核对材料。使用游标分批扫描,避免待核对任务挡住其他可清项;每批最多20项,有本轮耗时预算,真正变更前再持有本人锁重读状态。 + +不删除审批/操作防重放记录,不改状态回pending,不删除callback发送意图/回执,不碰用户原稿、附件或任务目录。清理完成后同操作仍返回原关闭状态,不能重新取得执行许可。清理是数据库字段更新,不承诺底层磁盘备份或历史数据库页物理抹除。 + +## 测试与证据 + +组合针对性回归192项通过、2项跳过;包括审批闭环、设备认证、卡片、交付、部署和身份发现。跳过的2项均需独立PostgreSQL测试地址:原授权/绑定测试,以及本轮新增的审批并发测试。本轮未连接生产数据库或真实平台业务写接口。 + +新增审计/清理用例覆盖:字段最小化、重复决定去重、清理后重放拒绝、活跃审批不清、环境隔离、审计失败消费回滚、配置限制以及业务结果未知的consumed保留。最终游标修订后另跑该专项,结果见build-support/m6-retention-final-20261117.xml;组合记录为build-support/m6-audit-retention-20261117.xml,两批不能重复累计为功能完成数。 + +tests/test_approval_postgres.py已准备独立随机schema的真实数据库竞争测试:同审批并发允许/拒绝、四连接竞争消费、重开连接后再次消费及审计决定唯一。仅显式设置HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL才运行,凭据不放命令行/交付说明;只建和清理本次随机测试schema,不使用现网配置。没有测试地址,不能将跳过写作通过。 + +## M6仍待完成 + +1. 独立安全复核:回调来源、操作者/卡片/nonce、任务与代次,以及“模型改ID”对重复请求的影响。 +2. 独立PostgreSQL执行新旧竞争用例,测试锁等待/连接重建和事务失败,不只验证SQLite。 +3. 真实手机允许/拒绝、超时/重复点击、客户端停止/失联后的旧卡片,按用户恢复验收的时间安排。 +4. 应用SDK三秒回调时限及正式部署回滚;桌面主dashboard候选版本另行核对。 +5. 审计留存参数评审、受控运维查询与释放策略。审计/清理代码完成不代表C207已验收或整个M6已完成。 + +后续更新:用户明确要求安全复核与PostgreSQL验证后,已在独立本机PostgreSQL 17.7补跑原跳过用例,并新增对抗修复;最终205通过0跳过,临时实例已停止。测试与剩余边界以M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md为准。这里记录的192通过2跳过是前一批历史结果,不再作为最新结果。 diff --git a/deployable/M6_FIX_TEST_DEPLOY_20261117.md b/deployable/M6_FIX_TEST_DEPLOY_20261117.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b08933 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployable/M6_FIX_TEST_DEPLOY_20261117.md @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +# M6修复测试环境升级 + +对象:ecs-fd74。父计划/home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-20261117已由用户确认三服务candidate、connector/router healthy及longconn platform_connected=yes;最后已部署源码为03d34f1。新计划使用/home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117,不能改用更早的work计划。 + +## 修复内容与证据 + +- 同任务同动作意图不能通过换operation_id及自动日历幂等键重新申请;真正不同动作可另行待确认。 +- 确认卡显示具体资源路径,超长目标拒绝,不静默截断。 +- 申请/决定/消费/关闭等事件增加最小审计,和状态变更处于同一事务。旧审批的历史事件不伪造补录。 +- 保留与清理逻辑已实现,但本次候选显式HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED=false,不删除既有审批内容或记录。手机现场测试继续暂缓。 + +205项核心组合回归通过,包含本机独立PostgreSQL 17.7的4/16连接竞争、SQL审计报错回滚和不同ID同意图竞争,0跳过。升级脚本修改后71项部署回归通过,包含从已启用审批的父计划再次升级及回滚;两批存在重叠,不能合算为276个不同功能验收。来源记录见M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md。 + +2026-11-17准备时本机到10.77.81.160的443请求超时,不能据此判定ECS服务故障;部署由用户在现有ECS shell执行,脚本会先核对实际镜像和父计划。此文档不表示升级已发生。 + +## 新候选准备与切换 + +先按交付命令fetch测试分支并用固定提交创建独立worktree:/home/cnooc/ecs-relay-approvals-m6-fix-20261117。下面步骤在该worktree内执行: + +```bash +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py state \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-20261117 + +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py prepare-update \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-20261117 \ + --output /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 \ + --enable-remote-approvals \ + --callback-identity /home/cnooc/hainuo-approval-callback-20261117.json + +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py build \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 + +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py activate \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 \ + --client-v2-ready + +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py state \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 +``` + +复用现有私有callback identity文件,不需再次输入/复制令牌。新目录若已存在停止,不自动删除、覆盖或重建。prepare/build不切换服务,activate仅定向重建原connector/router/longconn。各角色分别复用当前运行镜像作基础,不在线拉依赖,不启动第二个机器人连接。 + +保留数据库、材料、绑定和keyring;准备目录包含私有配置,禁止贴回或提交Git。启动会新增审计/保留元数据表,但清理开关为false,不做旧数据清理。首次启动时旧审批后续事件可能标为unknown类别,不据此编造历史created事件。 + +## 核对及回滚 + +输出应包含connector/router candidate running healthy、longconn candidate running及platform_connected observed=yes。SDK连接信号延迟时再次只读state,不重复activate。失败可能部分切换,先state查看,不自动删除数据或回退数据库。 + +回滚前停止进行中的审批任务,然后在本次新worktree执行: + +```bash +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py rollback \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 \ + --stop-broker-use + +sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py state \ + --plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 +``` + +仅恢复父计划三服务镜像和配置,不回退绑定、OAuth刷新数据或数据库,不移除新增表。此回滚应保留父计划已有审批功能,不回到最早未启用审批的环境。--stop-broker-use是操作者已停止任务的声明,脚本不会代停电脑或撤销已发生业务动作。 diff --git a/deployable/M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md b/deployable/M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..210e1c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployable/M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# M6安全复核与PostgreSQL并发验证 + +日期:2026-11-17。对象:feat/approval-foundation-local-20261117工作树中未提交的M6审计与审批增量,基于03d34f1。此处“独立复核”指从功能流程之外按对抗场景重新检查,不是另一位团队验收人的签字或第三方测评。 + +## 结论 + +复现并修复两类问题,三项初始负向检查均从失败转为通过。最终组合回归205项通过,0失败、0跳过。数据库相关用例在真实PostgreSQL 17.7执行,未再以缺测试地址跳过。 + +修改仅在本地源码,未提交/推送、未部署到ECS、未改变已安装客户端或清理开关。手机现场验收继续暂缓。当前已部署03d34f1不包含本轮修复,不能将本报告当作现网升级回执。 + +## 复核发现及修复 + +| 编号 | 初始可复现行为 | 影响与修复 | 回归结果 | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | +| R1 | 原审批拒绝后,换operation_id并随之更换客户端自动生成的日历idempotency_key,同一动作可再次申请成功并生成新审批。 | 没有证明能不经批准直接执行,但可绕开原拒绝反复发卡。新增同一可信任务内的动作意图校验,覆盖等待、拒绝、过期及已消费的原申请;更换操作ID不能抹掉原决定。 | pending、rejected、consumed下换ID均拒绝;同ID换参数拒绝;真正不同的新动作仍可待确认;PostgreSQL两连接同动作不同ID竞争只建一条。 | +| R2 | 确认卡只显示路径最后一段,两个不同日历都显示events;长资源标识静默截断。 | 用户不能判断真正目标。改为显示完整资源相对路径,保留日历/文件/成员等对象标识。超过300字符的目标直接拒绝,不能截断隐藏差异。 | 两个不同日历文案可区分;过长目标拒绝。 | + +R1保留完整operation_digest用于许可消费时逐字节核对。意图规范化仅去除已经核实为客户端按owner和operation_id生成的日历幂等键;不任意忽略业务参数。身份来源、请求正文、nonce、真正操作者及卡片校验均保留。 + +相同动作只能在同一个任务内复用原审批,不允许模型换ID重新发卡;用户明确发起的新任务是新的授权范围。每任务最多50个不同审批意图,超过预算停止。旧加密内容不可校验时拒绝新申请,而不是猜测放行。 + +## 复核边界 + +- 平台来源:只接所选长连接的内部认证通道;核对应用、租户、Verification Token、事件时效及回调类型。不把action.value中的身份或event.token更新凭据当来源证明。 +- 决定归属:操作者、私聊、原卡片、随机nonce、本人设备、绑定代次、原task及动作摘要都要匹配。错误应用/租户/用户/卡片、旧任务和旧绑定不能决定。 +- 单次许可:决定、消费和审计在数据库事务中执行,按本人锁串行化;已关闭审批不能复活。重投只返回已有事实,未知结果不重新执行。 +- 内容与日志:审计不保存正文或token;动作类别固定。清理默认关闭,不删除活跃或结果未知任务所需内容,保留防重放记录;清理不构成物理擦除承诺。 +- 恢复:停止控制取实际Agent,许可返回后再核对停止/绑定。许可consumed不宣称业务成功,网络中断不承诺撤销已有外部请求。 + +## 真实PostgreSQL验证 + +从官方EDB HTTPS地址获取便携PostgreSQL 17.7,解包到D盘测试目录,不安装Windows服务。每轮创建独立数据目录、随机密码、本机随机端口,仅监听127.0.0.1。测试数据库为合成专用hainuo_m6_test,测试表位于随机schema;没有使用任何生产DSN、应用密钥或真实业务记录。 + +数据库并发用例用Barrier同时放行独立连接,不是单连接顺序调用: + +1. 两连接竞争允许/拒绝,只有一个最终决定;覆盖自然竞争、预先允许及预先拒绝三种情况。 +2. 分别4和16连接竞争同一许可;允许时恰好一个execute=true,拒绝时全部false。 +3. 重开数据库连接后再次消费仍为false,原决定的审计事件保持唯一。 +4. 用PostgreSQL真实触发器让consumed审计INSERT报错,确认前面的状态UPDATE随同事务回滚,之后移除合成故障再按正常规则竞争。 +5. 两连接同时以不同操作ID申请同一动作,只建立一个审批,另一个拒绝。 +6. 原有PostgreSQL OAuth/绑定代次回归真实执行,不再跳过。 + +以上为6个参数化审批用例及1个授权/绑定用例;其他198项包含合成平台接口、SQLite应用链路、安全负向、卡片、部署与身份发现回归,不把205项都声称为PostgreSQL端到端业务实测。 + +初轮针对性验证12项通过。完整回归曾出现1个旧清理测试失败:它在清空原动作后,仍在同任务中申请新动作,与“无法校验旧意图则拒绝”的新保护冲突。调整为清理前创建活跃审批来验证不误清,未放宽正式校验。最终完整重跑205项全部通过。 + +## 证据和复现 + +最终XML:build-support/m6-independent-review-pg-final-20261117.xml。包含205项结果及耗时,未通过数与跳过数均为0。前序针对性XML:build-support/m6-postgres-20261117.xml。成对客户端源码仍通过HAINUO_APPROVAL_PC_SOURCE定位,缺少时不能宣称联合通过。 + +本地临时数据库的启动/运行/停止由工作区outputs/install-1087b-20261117/run_isolated_pg_tests.py完成;运行回执pg-test-receipt.json不含密码。下载来源与ZIP SHA256在D盘postgres-runtime/runtime-receipt.json,临时数据目录保留供复查,明文临时密码文件已移除。 + +部署仓库deployable目录的复现选择器: + +```text +tests/test_approval_postgres.py +tests/test_approval_security_review.py +tests/test_approval_audit.py +tests/test_approval_integration.py +tests/test_task_delivery.py +tests/test_task_cards.py +tests/test_credential_api.py +tests/test_broker_deploy.py +tests/test_approval_identity.py +``` + +PostgreSQL测试只读取明确指定的HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL。测试schema名称由代码固定前缀加随机十六进制组成,清理仅作用于该schema,不读取现网配置。最终运行后pg_ctl已停止该独立测试实例。 + +## 尚不能据此放行的事项 + +- 真实手机点击、私有化SDK三秒回调时限,以及ECS ARM64与现场PostgreSQL版本的整链路行为仍未验收;Windows本地PostgreSQL通过不代替这些事实。 +- 真实服务器在提交中途退出、平台业务回执真实丢失、数据库网络分区等仍需要独立环境故障注入;当前证明是账本事务、并发和合成失联行为。 +- 当前审批执行闸门覆盖Work API边界,不是任意execute_code/终端工具的沙箱。M2/M8仍需完成所有工具统一风险规则与外部材料指令隔离,不能宣称整个客户端已安全放行。 +- 团队仍需另一位具备权限的工程师复核补丁并验收;本轮没有合并master或部署修复。M6整体保持待验收。 diff --git a/deployable/relay/approval_api.py b/deployable/relay/approval_api.py index afd5b2e..a107538 100644 --- a/deployable/relay/approval_api.py +++ b/deployable/relay/approval_api.py @@ -101,3 +101,6 @@ class ApprovalAPI: await self.worker.call('close_unavailable') for approval_id in await self.worker.call('cards_to_send'):self._schedule('send',approval_id) for approval_id in await self.worker.call('cards_to_close'):self._schedule('close',approval_id) + if self.auth.s.approval_retention_enabled: + await self.worker.call('maintain_retention',self.auth.s.approval_payload_retention_days, + self.auth.s.approval_audit_retention_days) diff --git a/deployable/relay/approval_audit.py b/deployable/relay/approval_audit.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9bbcd38 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployable/relay/approval_audit.py @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +"""Minimal approval audit; no action bodies, tokens, names or card text.""" +import hashlib +from .crypto import canonical + +EVENTS={'created','approved','rejected','consumed','expired','cancelled','card_bound', + 'card_send_unknown','payload_purged'} +STATES={'pending','approved','rejected','consumed','expired','cancelled'} +ACTION_CLASSES={'work_api_read','work_api_write','work_api_delete','unknown'} + + +class ApprovalAudit: + def __init__(self,db,clock): + self.db,self.clock=db,clock + with db: + db.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS work_approval_audit_v1( + event_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,environment TEXT NOT NULL,app_id TEXT NOT NULL, + approval_id TEXT NOT NULL,task_scope TEXT NOT NULL,actor_scope TEXT NOT NULL, + device_scope TEXT NOT NULL,binding_generation BIGINT NOT NULL, + operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,event TEXT NOT NULL,state TEXT NOT NULL,action_class TEXT NOT NULL, + created_at DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL)''') + db.execute('''CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS work_approval_audit_time_v1 + ON work_approval_audit_v1(environment,app_id,created_at)''') + + def record(self,row,event,action_class=None): + # Caller owns the approval transaction and owner lock. Failure rolls + # back the associated decision/consume instead of losing its audit. + if event not in EVENTS or row['state']not in STATES:raise ValueError('invalid_approval_audit') + scope=[row['environment'],row['app_id']] + if action_class is None: + created=self.db.execute('''SELECT action_class FROM work_approval_audit_v1 + WHERE environment=? AND app_id=? AND approval_id=? AND event='created' ''', + (*scope,row['approval_id'])).fetchone() + action_class=created['action_class']if created else'unknown' + if action_class not in ACTION_CLASSES:raise ValueError('invalid_approval_audit_class') + def digest(kind,value):return hashlib.sha256(canonical([*scope,kind,value])).hexdigest() + key=digest('audit',[row['approval_id'],event]) + self.db.execute('''INSERT INTO work_approval_audit_v1 VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?) + ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING''',(key,*scope,row['approval_id'],digest('task',row['task_id']), + digest('actor',row['owner']),digest('device',row['host_id']),row['binding_generation'], + row['operation_digest'],event,row['state'],action_class,self.clock())) diff --git a/deployable/relay/approval_policy.py b/deployable/relay/approval_policy.py index 93fd60b..8cc8cb2 100644 --- a/deployable/relay/approval_policy.py +++ b/deployable/relay/approval_policy.py @@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ def describe_action(action): if isinstance(action['body'].get(key),str)and action['body'][key].strip()),'') if any(ord(char)<32 for char in subject):subject='' summary=verb+label+'中的指定数据'+(':'+subject if subject else'') - resource=parts[-1][:100] + resource='/'.join(parts[4:]) + if len(resource)>300:raise ApprovalError('approval_target_display_budget_exceeded') impact=('本次是查询,但该接口尚未列入自动放行范围。'if method=='GET'else '可能修改平台数据或触发通知;已经发生的操作不能保证自动撤销。') if method=='DELETE':impact='会删除指定数据或移除关联,可能影响其他人,且不一定能够恢复。' diff --git a/deployable/relay/approval_store.py b/deployable/relay/approval_store.py index 5ddc4e0..91dfb84 100644 --- a/deployable/relay/approval_store.py +++ b/deployable/relay/approval_store.py @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import re import secrets import time from .crypto import canonical +from .approval_audit import ApprovalAudit class ApprovalError(ValueError): @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: self.state,self.db,self.keyring,self.clock=state,state.db,keyring,clock self.enforce_execution_state=enforce_execution_state self._sweep_after='' + self._retention_after='' with self.db: self.db.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS work_approvals_v3( approval_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,environment TEXT NOT NULL,app_id TEXT NOT NULL, @@ -63,6 +65,9 @@ class ApprovalStore: updated_at DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL)''') self.db.execute('''CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS work_approvals_expiry_v3 ON work_approvals_v3(environment,app_id,state,expires_at)''') + self.db.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS work_approval_retention_v1( + approval_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,purged_at DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL)''') + self.audit=ApprovalAudit(self.db,self.clock) def _task(self,task_id,owner,host,generation): if type(generation)is not int or generation<1: @@ -83,6 +88,21 @@ class ApprovalStore: return canonical(['work-approval-v3',*[row[k]for k in ('environment','app_id','task_id', 'owner','host_id','binding_generation','operation_id','operation_digest','approval_id')]]) + @staticmethod + def _intent(action,owner,operation_id): + normalized=json.loads(json.dumps(action,sort_keys=True,ensure_ascii=True,allow_nan=False)) + # The calendar key is generated by our PC boundary from owner+op ID; + # changing that generated key must not turn a denied action into a new + # business intent. No arbitrary caller field is discarded otherwise. + if (normalized.get('kind')=='work-api-v1'and normalized.get('method')=='POST' + and isinstance(normalized.get('path'),str) + and re.fullmatch(r'/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/[A-Za-z0-9_.@!:$-]+/events',normalized['path']) + and isinstance(normalized.get('params'),dict)): + expected=hashlib.sha256(canonical([owner,operation_id])).hexdigest() + if normalized['params'].get('idempotency_key')==expected: + normalized['params'].pop('idempotency_key') + return hashlib.sha256(canonical(normalized)).hexdigest() + def _row(self,approval_id): if not isinstance(approval_id,str)or not re.fullmatch(r'apr_[a-f0-9]{64}',approval_id): raise ApprovalError('invalid_approval_reference') @@ -96,6 +116,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='expired',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')", (self.clock(),row['approval_id'])) row=self._row(row['approval_id']) + self.audit.record(row,'expired') return row @staticmethod @@ -121,6 +142,20 @@ class ApprovalStore: if (row['owner'],row['host_id'],row['binding_generation'],row['operation_digest'])!=(owner,host,generation,digest): raise ApprovalError('operation_identity_conflict') return self._status(row) + # Scope to the SAME authenticated task. Legitimate subsequent user + # tasks are independent; changing a model-chosen operation ID inside + # this task cannot erase a rejection, expiry or consumed grant. + intent=self._intent(action,owner,operation_id) + previous=self.db.execute('''SELECT * FROM work_approvals_v3 + WHERE environment=? AND app_id=? AND task_id=? LIMIT 51''', + (self.state.environment,self.state.app_id,task_id)).fetchall() + if len(previous)>=50:raise ApprovalError('approval_task_budget_exceeded') + for prior in previous: + prior=dict(prior) + if not prior['ciphertext']:raise ApprovalError('approval_intent_unavailable') + original=json.loads(self.keyring.decrypt(prior['key_id'],prior['ciphertext'],self._aad(prior))) + if hmac.compare_digest(intent,self._intent(original['action'],prior['owner'],prior['operation_id'])): + raise ApprovalError('approval_intent_already_registered') nonce=secrets.token_urlsafe(32) row={'approval_id':approval_id,'environment':task['environment'],'app_id':task['app_id'], 'task_id':task_id,'owner':owner,'host_id':host,'binding_generation':generation, @@ -131,6 +166,9 @@ class ApprovalStore: self.db.execute('INSERT INTO work_approvals_v3 VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)', (approval_id,row['environment'],row['app_id'],task_id,owner,host,generation,operation_id,digest, hashlib.sha256(nonce.encode()).hexdigest(),key,cipher,'','pending',expires,self.clock())) + action_class=('work_api_delete'if action.get('method')=='DELETE'else + 'work_api_read'if action.get('method')=='GET'else'work_api_write')if action.get('kind')=='work-api-v1'else'unknown' + self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'created',action_class) return self._status(self._row(approval_id)) def card_material(self,approval_id): @@ -152,6 +190,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: task=self.state.task(row['task_id']) if row['state']in {'pending','approved'}and(not self.state.task_current(task)or task['status']!='inflight'or self._execution_closed(row['task_id'])): self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='cancelled',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=?",(self.clock(),approval_id)) + self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'cancelled') if not self.db.execute('SELECT approval_id FROM work_approval_card_outbox_v1 WHERE approval_id=?',(approval_id,)).fetchone(): raise ApprovalError('approval_send_intent_required') if row['card_message_id']not in ('',message_id):raise ApprovalError('approval_card_conflict') @@ -159,6 +198,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: (message_id,self.clock(),approval_id)) self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approval_card_outbox_v1 SET state='sent',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=?", (self.clock(),approval_id)) + self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'card_bound') def claim_card(self,approval_id): """Persist send intent before network I/O; lost receipt is not resendable.""" @@ -174,8 +214,9 @@ class ApprovalStore: def card_send_unknown(self,approval_id): with self.db: - self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approval_card_outbox_v1 SET state='unknown',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='sending'", - (self.clock(),approval_id)) + changed=self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approval_card_outbox_v1 SET state='unknown',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='sending'", + (self.clock(),approval_id)).rowcount + if changed:self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'card_send_unknown') def close_unavailable(self,limit=100): """Future bounded maintenance: expiry or invalid task never grants consent.""" @@ -199,6 +240,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')", (state,self.clock(),row['approval_id'])) closed.append({'approval_id':row['approval_id'],'state':state}) + self.audit.record(self._row(row['approval_id']),state) self._sweep_after=candidate['approval_id'] return closed @@ -269,6 +311,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: (row['environment'],row['app_id'],decision.event_id,row['approval_id'],decision.event_digest,self.clock())) self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='pending'", (target,self.clock(),row['approval_id'])) + self.audit.record(self._row(row['approval_id']),target) return self._status(self._row(row['approval_id'])) def status(self,approval_id,task_id,owner,host,generation,operation_digest): @@ -292,6 +335,7 @@ class ApprovalStore: changed=self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='consumed',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='approved'", (self.clock(),approval_id)).rowcount if changed!=1:return {**self._status(self._row(approval_id)),'execute':False} + self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'consumed') return {**self._status(self._row(approval_id)),'execute':True,'action':material['action']} def cancel(self,approval_id,task_id,owner,host,generation): @@ -299,6 +343,43 @@ class ApprovalStore: self.state._owner_lock(owner);row=self._row(approval_id) self._task(task_id,owner,host,generation) if (row['task_id'],row['owner'],row['host_id'],row['binding_generation'])!=(task_id,owner,host,generation):raise ApprovalError('approval_identity_conflict') - self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='cancelled',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')", - (self.clock(),approval_id)) + changed=self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='cancelled',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')", + (self.clock(),approval_id)).rowcount + if changed:self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'cancelled') return self._status(self._row(approval_id)) + + def maintain_retention(self,payload_days=30,audit_days=90,limit=10): + """Prune CLOSED payloads/audit only. Durable tombstones fence replay.""" + if (type(payload_days)is not int or type(audit_days)is not int + or not 1<=payload_days<=audit_days<=365 or type(limit)is not int or not 1<=limit<=20): + raise ApprovalError('invalid_approval_retention') + cutoff=self.clock()-payload_days*86400 + rows=self.db.execute('''SELECT approval_id FROM work_approvals_v3 a WHERE environment=? AND app_id=? + AND state IN ('rejected','expired','cancelled','consumed') AND updated_at? + AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM work_approval_retention_v1 r WHERE r.approval_id=a.approval_id) + ORDER BY approval_id LIMIT ?''',(self.state.environment,self.state.app_id,cutoff,self._retention_after,limit)).fetchall() + if not rows:self._retention_after='' + purged=0;started=time.monotonic() + for item in rows: + if time.monotonic()-started>.5:break + self._retention_after=item['approval_id'] + with self.db: + row=self._row(item['approval_id']);self.state._owner_lock(row['owner']);row=self._row(row['approval_id']) + if row['state']not in {'rejected','expired','cancelled','consumed'}or row['updated_at']>=cutoff:continue + if row['state']=='consumed': + task=self.state.task(row['task_id']) + if not task or task['status']in {'inflight','unknown'}:continue + marked=self.db.execute('INSERT INTO work_approval_retention_v1 VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING', + (row['approval_id'],self.clock())).rowcount + if not marked:continue + self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET ciphertext='',key_id='',nonce_digest='' WHERE approval_id=?",(row['approval_id'],)) + self.audit.record(row,'payload_purged');purged+=1 + # Audit removal is bounded too; approval and operation tombstones stay. + with self.db: + removed=self.db.execute('''DELETE FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event_key IN ( + SELECT x.event_key FROM work_approval_audit_v1 x JOIN work_approval_retention_v1 r + ON r.approval_id=x.approval_id WHERE x.environment=? AND x.app_id=? AND x.created_at={'created','card_bound','approved','consumed'} + assert sum(r['event']=='approved'for r in events)==1 + assert sum(r['event']=='consumed'for r in events)==1 + encoded=json.dumps(events) + for secret in ('ou_a','oc_synthetic','om_source','合成测试','fake-access','verification-synthetic',row['ciphertext']): + assert secret not in encoded + assert all(len(r['actor_scope'])==64 and len(r['device_scope'])==64 for r in events) + assert all(r['action_class']=='work_api_write'for r in events) + + +async def test_closed_payload_purge_keeps_replay_tombstone_and_active_payload(pair): + p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();await p['click']('deny') + from test_approval_integration import pc_errors + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time() + with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=?',(now-31*86400,)) + api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now) + active=api.create('task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,'operation-active',{'kind':'synthetic'},'合成动作','仅测试') + with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=?', + (now-32*86400,active['approval_id'])) + result=api.maintain_retention() + assert result['payloads_purged']==1 and result['tombstones_preserved'] + saved=e['store'].db.execute('SELECT * FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone() + assert saved['state']=='rejected'and saved['ciphertext']==''and saved['nonce_digest']=='' + assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0 + status=api.status(row['approval_id'],'task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,row['operation_digest']) + assert status['state']=='rejected' + assert api.consume(row['approval_id'],'task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,row['operation_digest'])['execute']is False + action=json.loads(e['api'].broker.store.keyring.decrypt(row['key_id'],row['ciphertext'],api._aad(row)))['action'] + assert api.create('task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,'operation-synthetic',action,'同动作','不得重新放行')['state']=='rejected' + # A pre-existing pending approval is not selected even when timestamp is old. + assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0 + assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT ciphertext FROM work_approvals_v3 WHERE approval_id=?', + (active['approval_id'],)).fetchone()['ciphertext'] + + +async def test_retention_is_environment_scoped_and_bounded(pair): + p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();await p['click']('deny') + from test_approval_integration import pc_errors + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time() + api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now) + with e['store'].db: + e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=?',(now-100*86400,)) + e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approval_audit_v1 SET created_at=?',(now-100*86400,)) + result=api.maintain_retention(limit=1) + assert result['audit_events_removed']==1 + assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['n']==1 + assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approval_callbacks_v1').fetchone()['n']==1 + for kwargs in ({'payload_days':0},{'audit_days':366},{'payload_days':91,'audit_days':90},{'limit':100}): + with pytest.raises(ApprovalError):api.maintain_retention(**kwargs) + + +async def test_audit_write_failure_rolls_back_consume_and_never_sends(pair,monkeypatch): + from relay.approval_audit import ApprovalAudit + from test_approval_integration import pc_errors + original=ApprovalAudit.record + def fail_consume(self,row,event,action_class=None): + if event=='consumed':raise RuntimeError('synthetic audit storage failure') + return original(self,row,event,action_class) + monkeypatch.setattr(ApprovalAudit,'record',fail_consume) + p=pair;job=p['launch']();await p['click']() + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + e=p['env'] + assert not p['calls'] + assert e['store'].db.execute("SELECT state FROM work_approvals_v3").fetchone()['state']!='consumed' + assert not e['store'].db.execute("SELECT * FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event='consumed'").fetchall() + + +async def test_retention_never_touches_another_environment(pair): + from test_approval_integration import pc_errors + p=pair;job=p['launch']();await p['click']('deny') + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time() + with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET environment='development',updated_at=?",(now-100*86400,)) + api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now) + assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0 + assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT ciphertext FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['ciphertext'] + + +def test_retention_configuration_is_explicit_and_ordered(): + from relay.config import Settings + from pydantic import ValidationError + settings=Settings(role='test',environment='test') + assert settings.approval_retention_enabled is False + assert (settings.approval_payload_retention_days,settings.approval_audit_retention_days)==(30,90) + for changes in ({'approval_retention_enabled':True}, + {'approval_payload_retention_days':91,'approval_audit_retention_days':90}, + {'approval_audit_retention_days':366}): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError):Settings(role='test',environment='test',**changes) + + +async def test_consumed_but_result_unknown_is_not_purged(pair): + p=pair;job=p['launch']();await p['click']();await job + e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time() + api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now) + with e['store'].db: + e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=?',(now-100*86400,)) + e['store'].db.execute("UPDATE work_tasks_v2 SET status='unknown'") + assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0 + assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT ciphertext FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['ciphertext'] + with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute("UPDATE work_tasks_v2 SET status='completed'") + # Bounded keyset scan wraps on the next maintenance pass. + outcomes=[api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']for _ in range(2)] + assert sum(outcomes)==1 diff --git a/deployable/tests/test_approval_postgres.py b/deployable/tests/test_approval_postgres.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49cc3ee --- /dev/null +++ b/deployable/tests/test_approval_postgres.py @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +"""Opt-in isolated-schema PostgreSQL race test; never uses production config.""" +from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor +import hashlib +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import secrets +import time +import threading + +import pytest +import psycopg +from psycopg.conninfo import make_conninfo +from relay.store import Store +from relay.binding_state import BindingState +from relay.credential_store import CredentialKeyring +from relay.approval_store import ApprovalStore,VerifiedDecision,ApprovalError +from relay.crypto import canonical + +pytestmark=pytest.mark.skipif(not os.environ.get('HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL'),reason='isolated PostgreSQL test URL not supplied') + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize('winner',['race','allow','deny']) +@pytest.mark.parametrize('consumers',[4,16]) +def test_concurrent_postgres_decisions_consumption_and_reopen(tmp_path,winner,consumers): + schema='approval_test_'+secrets.token_hex(10) + target=os.environ['HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL'] + control=psycopg.connect(target,autocommit=True) + control.execute('CREATE SCHEMA '+schema) + dsn=make_conninfo(target,options='-c search_path='+schema,connect_timeout=5) + keyring=CredentialKeyring('synthetic',{ 'synthetic':secrets.token_bytes(32)}) + connections=[] + def connect(): + store=Store(tmp_path/'unused.sqlite',dsn) + store.db.execute("SET lock_timeout TO '2s'") + store.db.execute("SET statement_timeout TO '3s'") + state=BindingState(store,'test','cli_pg_test') + return store,state,ApprovalStore(state,keyring) + try: + store,state,approvals=connect();connections.append(store) + with store.db: + store.db.execute("INSERT INTO devices VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",('a'*32,'synthetic-cert','synthetic-fingerprint','ou_pg',0,1)) + state.create_task('pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,'session','worker',time.time()+300,'oc_pg','om_pg_source') + action={'kind':'synthetic','value':'no real side effect'} + item=approvals.create('pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,'pg-operation',action,'合成并发确认','不执行真实业务') + material=approvals.card_material(item['approval_id']);assert approvals.claim_card(item['approval_id']) + approvals.bind_card(item['approval_id'],'om_pg_card') + def make_decision(choice): + fields=dict(environment='test',app_id='cli_pg_test',actor_open_id='ou_pg',chat_id='oc_pg', + card_message_id='om_pg_card',approval_id=item['approval_id'],nonce=material['nonce'],choice=choice) + return VerifiedDecision(**fields,event_id=secrets.token_hex(16),event_digest=hashlib.sha256(canonical(fields)).hexdigest()) + if winner!='race':approvals.decide(make_decision(winner)) + decision_gate=threading.Barrier(2,timeout=10) + def decide(choice): + connection,_,ledger=connect() + try: + decision_gate.wait() + try:return ledger.decide(make_decision(choice))['state'] + except ApprovalError:return 'conflict' + finally:connection.close() + with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2)as executor: + decisions=list(executor.map(decide,('allow','deny'))) + row=store.db.execute('SELECT state FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone() + assert row['state']in {'approved','rejected'}and decisions.count('conflict')==1 + if winner=='allow': + # A real PostgreSQL statement error must roll back the earlier + # consumed UPDATE in the same transaction, not merely hide a reply. + store.db.execute("""CREATE FUNCTION fail_approval_audit() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$ + BEGIN IF NEW.event='consumed' THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'synthetic audit storage failure'; + END IF; RETURN NEW; END $$""") + store.db.execute('''CREATE TRIGGER synthetic_audit_failure BEFORE INSERT ON work_approval_audit_v1 + FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION fail_approval_audit()''') + with pytest.raises(psycopg.Error): + approvals.consume(item['approval_id'],'pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,item['operation_digest']) + assert store.db.execute('SELECT state FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['state']=='approved' + assert not store.db.execute("SELECT * FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event='consumed'").fetchall() + store.db.execute('DROP TRIGGER synthetic_audit_failure ON work_approval_audit_v1') + store.db.execute('DROP FUNCTION fail_approval_audit()') + consume_gate=threading.Barrier(consumers,timeout=20) + def consume(_): + connection,_,ledger=connect() + try: + consume_gate.wait() + return ledger.consume(item['approval_id'],'pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,item['operation_digest'])['execute'] + finally:connection.close() + with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=consumers)as executor:executed=list(executor.map(consume,range(consumers))) + assert sum(executed)==(1 if row['state']=='approved'else 0) + restored,_,ledger=connect();connections.append(restored) + assert ledger.consume(item['approval_id'],'pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,item['operation_digest'])['execute']is False + assert store.db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event IN ('approved','rejected')").fetchone()['n']==1 + state.create_task('pg-intent-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,'session','worker',time.time()+300,'oc_pg','om_pg_intent') + intent_gate=threading.Barrier(2,timeout=10) + def create_same_intent(operation): + connection,_,ledger=connect() + try: + intent_gate.wait() + try: + ledger.create('pg-intent-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,operation,action,'相同合成动作','不执行真实业务') + return 'created' + except ApprovalError:return 'conflict' + finally:connection.close() + with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2)as executor: + outcomes=list(executor.map(create_same_intent,('pg-intent-one','pg-intent-two'))) + assert outcomes.count('created')==1 and outcomes.count('conflict')==1 + assert store.db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approvals_v3 WHERE task_id='pg-intent-task'").fetchone()['n']==1 + finally: + for connection in connections:connection.close() + # The unique generated test schema is the only deletion target. + control.execute('DROP SCHEMA '+schema+' CASCADE');control.close() diff --git a/deployable/tests/test_approval_security_review.py b/deployable/tests/test_approval_security_review.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8064a69 --- /dev/null +++ b/deployable/tests/test_approval_security_review.py @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +"""Adversarial M6 checks, no real platform operations.""" +import hashlib +import json +import pytest +from test_credential_api import env,wire +from test_approval_integration import approval_env,pair,pc_errors +from relay.approval_store import ApprovalStore,ApprovalError +from relay.approval_policy import describe_action +from relay.crypto import canonical + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize('choice',[None,'deny','allow']) +async def test_same_intent_cannot_get_new_card_by_changing_operation_id(pair,choice): + p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']() + if choice: + await p['click'](choice) + if choice=='deny': + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + else:await job + e=p['env'];ledger=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring) + action=json.loads(ledger.keyring.decrypt(row['key_id'],row['ciphertext'],ledger._aad(row)))['action'] + other='new-operation-id' + action['params']['idempotency_key']=hashlib.sha256(canonical(['ou_a',other])).hexdigest() + path='/work/v2/approvals/create' + response=await e['client'].post(path,json=wire(e,path,task_id='task-approval',operation_id=other,action=action,ttl=120)) + assert response.status_code==409 + assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['n']==1 + assert len(p['calls'])==(1 if choice=='allow'else 0) + if not choice: + p['stop'].set() + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + + +def test_confirmation_identifies_actual_calendar_not_just_events_suffix(): + def action(calendar):return {'kind':'work-api-v1','method':'POST', + 'path':'/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/'+calendar+'/events','params':{},'body':{'summary':'同一标题'}} + first=describe_action(action('calendar_a')) + second=describe_action(action('calendar_b')) + assert 'calendar_a'in first[1]and 'calendar_b'in second[1]and first!=second + + +def test_long_target_is_rejected_instead_of_silently_truncated(): + with pytest.raises(ApprovalError):describe_action({'kind':'work-api-v1','method':'DELETE', + 'path':'/open-apis/drive/v1/files/'+'x'*400,'params':{},'body':{}}) + + +async def test_changed_action_same_id_rejected_but_distinct_new_action_can_confirm(pair): + p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();await p['click']('deny') + with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job + e=p['env'];ledger=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring) + action=json.loads(ledger.keyring.decrypt(row['key_id'],row['ciphertext'],ledger._aad(row)))['action'] + action['body']['summary']='真正不同的合成动作' + path='/work/v2/approvals/create' + same=await e['client'].post(path,json=wire(e,path,task_id='task-approval', + operation_id='operation-synthetic',action=action,ttl=120)) + assert same.status_code==409 + other='distinct-operation' + action['params']['idempotency_key']=hashlib.sha256(canonical(['ou_a',other])).hexdigest() + distinct=await e['client'].post(path,json=wire(e,path,task_id='task-approval', + operation_id=other,action=action,ttl=120)) + assert distinct.status_code==200 and distinct.json()['state']=='pending' + assert not p['calls'] diff --git a/deployable/tests/test_broker_deploy.py b/deployable/tests/test_broker_deploy.py index 1d11b1a..2f8f102 100644 --- a/deployable/tests/test_broker_deploy.py +++ b/deployable/tests/test_broker_deploy.py @@ -698,12 +698,35 @@ def test_approval_update_preserves_runtime_ancestry_and_original_longconn_rollba assert plan['longconn_base_image']==scenario['roles']['longconn']['image'] assert candidate['services']['longconn']['image']!=candidate['services']['connector']['image'] assert candidate['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_CREDENTIAL_MODE']=='broker' + assert candidate['services']['connector']['environment']['HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED']=='false' assert rollback['services']['longconn']['image']==scenario['roles']['longconn']['image'] assert rollback['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_CREDENTIAL_MODE']=='legacy' assert rollback['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED']=='false' assert (root/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes()==(Path(args.plan)/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes() +def test_second_approval_update_uses_active_parent_images_and_retains_off(scenario): + args=approval_update(scenario);deploy.prepare_update(args) + root=Path(args.output);parent=deploy.load_plan(root) + connector='sha256:'+'c'*64;longconn='sha256:'+'d'*64 + for name in ('connector','router'):scenario['roles'][name]['image']=connector + scenario['roles']['longconn']['image']=longconn + deploy.write_json(root/'candidate.json',{'image':connector,'tag':parent['candidate_image']}) + deploy.write_json(root/'candidate-longconn.json',{'image':longconn,'tag':parent['longconn_candidate_image']}) + output=root.parent/'approvals-m6-fix' + deploy.prepare_update(argparse.Namespace(plan=str(root),source_root=str(ROOT),output=str(output), + enable_remote_approvals=True,callback_identity=args.callback_identity)) + result=deploy.load_plan(output) + candidate=json.loads((output/'compose.broker.json').read_text()) + rollback=json.loads((output/'compose.rollback.json').read_text()) + assert result['base_image']==connector and result['longconn_base_image']==longconn + assert candidate['services']['connector']['environment']['HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED']=='false' + assert rollback['services']['connector']['image']==connector + assert rollback['services']['longconn']['image']==longconn + assert rollback['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED']=='true' + assert (output/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes()==(root/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes() + + def test_approval_runtime_checks_three_roles_and_sdk_without_network(scenario): args=approval_update(scenario);deploy.prepare_update(args);root=Path(args.output);plan=deploy.load_plan(root) scenario['calls'].clear();deploy.runtime_check(root,plan)