Files
ecs-relay-service/deployable/relay/router.py
ex_tianzy d1ab834ecb feat(lifecycle): add stage 4 authoritative unbind and durable task routing
Unify broker-mode binding changes in database transactions: advance device
generation, invalidate pending authorizations/tasks and prior pairing-code
epochs, and persist audit plus invalidation outbox. Add authenticated device
unbind alongside robot/admin paths. Pairing codes are hashed, generation-
fenced and consumed atomically with binding.

Replay Redis invalidation effects without undoing committed unbind. Guard
online cleanup and delayed kill events by generation. Introduce a separate
router admission credential with no platform-event injection authority.
Router verifies signed nonce-bound internal admission on handshake, task
traffic and periodic checks; reject stale sessions and control-plane outages.

Persist task owner/device/generation/session/worker and original message
mapping. Sign routing metadata, verify late results, claim replies once and
mark ambiguous/crashed tasks unknown instead of replaying writes. Fence
notifications across same-user rebind. Release in-memory slots/waiters even
when database or Redis cleanup fails.

Validation: 213 passed, 3 skipped (real PostgreSQL not configured), 30 existing
uvicorn/websockets deprecation warnings. New lifecycle coverage: 28 tests,
including real loopback WebSocket isolation, reverse completion, missed kill,
periodic unbind checks, outbox recovery, transaction rollback and cleanup
failures. Syntax, docs and staged diff checks pass.

Default legacy mode remains unchanged. Broker mode now requires coordinated
router admission configuration and a v2 client handshake. No production ECS
configuration, real credentials or client installer was changed. PostgreSQL,
real Redis multi-node, ARM64 and actual Work/client rollout remain stage 5.
2026-11-04 11:43:53 +08:00

221 lines
9.8 KiB
Python

import asyncio
import contextlib
import json
import secrets
import time
import hashlib
import httpx
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
from fastapi import FastAPI, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
from redis.asyncio import Redis
from redis.exceptions import WatchError
from .config import Settings
from .crypto import canonical, fingerprint, load_public, raw_public, verified, verify_device
async def compare_delete(redis, key, expected):
async with redis.pipeline() as pipe:
try:
await pipe.watch(key)
if await pipe.get(key) != expected:
return False
pipe.multi()
pipe.delete(key)
await pipe.execute()
return True
except WatchError:
return False
async def compare_expire(redis, key, expected, ttl):
async with redis.pipeline() as pipe:
try:
await pipe.watch(key)
if await pipe.get(key) != expected:
return False
pipe.multi()
pipe.expire(key, ttl)
await pipe.execute()
return True
except WatchError:
return False
def create_app(settings=None, redis=None, admission_transport=None):
s = settings or Settings(role="router")
r = redis or Redis.from_url(s.redis_url, decode_responses=True)
ca = s.ca_cert.read_bytes()
active = set()
internal = (httpx.AsyncClient(base_url=s.connector_internal_url.rstrip('/'),timeout=3,
trust_env=False,follow_redirects=False,transport=admission_transport) if s.credential_mode == "broker" else None)
connector_public = load_public(s.connector_public_key) if internal else None
async def admission(host, owner, generation, *, turn=None, session=None, expected_fp=None):
nonce = secrets.token_hex(16)
response = await internal.post("/internal/devices/"+host+"/admission",
headers={"X-Router-Admission-Secret":s.router_admission_secret},
json={"nonce":nonce,"turn_id":turn,"session_id":session})
if response.status_code != 200:
raise ValueError("device admission rejected")
data = verified(response.json(),connector_public)
if (data["nonce"] != nonce or data["host_id"] != host or data["owner"] != owner
or data["binding_generation"] != generation or data["environment"] != s.environment
or data["app_id"] != s.feishu_app_id or data["protocol_version"] != 2
or data["turn_id"] != turn or data["session_id"] != session
or not time.time() <= data["expires_at"] <= time.time()+10
or data["fingerprint"] != expected_fp):
raise ValueError("stale device admission")
return data
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app):
await r.ping()
yield
if internal:
await internal.aclose()
if redis is None:
await r.aclose()
app = FastAPI(title="Hainuo B2 router", lifespan=lifespan, docs_url=None, redoc_url=None)
app.state.redis = r
@app.get("/health")
async def health():
return {"status": "alive", "role": "router"}
@app.get("/ready")
async def ready():
await r.ping()
return {"status": "ready", "connections": len(active)}
@app.websocket("/device/ws")
async def device(ws: WebSocket):
from .common import rate_limit
from fastapi import HTTPException
await ws.accept()
if len(active) >= s.max_connections:
await ws.close(1013)
return
ip = ws.client.host if ws.client else "unknown"
try:
await rate_limit(r, "ws:" + ip, 30)
except HTTPException:
await ws.close(1008)
return
challenge = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
host = session = presence = None
tasks = []
pub = None
try:
await ws.send_json({"type": "challenge", "challenge": challenge})
hello = await asyncio.wait_for(ws.receive_json(), timeout=10)
if len(json.dumps(hello)) > 20000:
raise ValueError("oversized hello")
host = hello["host_id"]
if not isinstance(host, str) or len(host) != 32 or any(c not in "0123456789abcdef" for c in host):
raise ValueError("invalid host")
public = verify_device(hello["cert"], ca, host)
proof = verified(hello["proof"], public)
if proof["challenge"] != challenge or proof["host_id"] != host or abs(time.time() - proof["ts"]) > 90:
raise ValueError("invalid proof")
if len(proof["kx"]) > 64 or len(proof["session_id"]) > 64:
raise ValueError("invalid session")
fp = fingerprint(hello["cert"])
if await r.get("hn:device:" + host) != fp or await r.exists("hn:revoked:" + host):
raise ValueError("unregistered/revoked")
generation = owner = None
if internal:
generation, owner = proof["binding_generation"], proof["binding_owner"]
if (type(generation) is not int or generation < 0 or type(proof.get("protocol_version")) is not int
or proof.get("protocol_version") != 2
or proof.get("environment") != s.environment or proof.get("app_id") != s.feishu_app_id):
raise ValueError("invalid binding handshake")
await admission(host,owner,generation,expected_fp=fp)
session = proof["session_id"]
presence = json.dumps({"cert": hello["cert"], "proof": hello["proof"], "challenge": challenge})
if not await r.set("hn:online:" + host, presence, nx=True, ex=30):
raise ValueError("already connected")
active.add(session)
pub = r.pubsub()
await pub.subscribe("hn:down:" + host, "hn:kill:" + host)
if internal:
await admission(host,owner,generation,expected_fp=fp)
await ws.send_json({"type": "connected", "session_id": session})
async def downstream():
async for msg in pub.listen():
if msg["type"] != "message":
continue
if msg["channel"] == "hn:kill:" + host:
if internal:
event = json.loads(msg["data"])
if generation >= event["binding_generation"]:
continue
await ws.close(1008)
return
if internal:
packet = json.loads(msg["data"])
routing = verified(packet["routing"],connector_public)
if (routing["host_id"] != host or routing["session_id"] != session
or routing["environment"] != s.environment or routing["app_id"] != s.feishu_app_id
or routing["binding_generation"] != generation
or routing["envelope_hash"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical(packet["envelope"])).hexdigest()):
raise ValueError("invalid instruction routing")
await admission(host,owner,generation,turn=routing["turn_id"],session=session,expected_fp=fp)
await ws.send_text(msg["data"])
async def heartbeat():
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(8)
if internal:
await admission(host,owner,generation,expected_fp=fp)
if await r.exists("hn:revoked:" + host) or not await compare_expire(r, "hn:online:" + host, presence, 30):
await ws.close(1008)
return
async def upstream():
while True:
text = await ws.receive_text()
if len(text.encode()) > s.max_body:
raise ValueError("oversized frame")
data = json.loads(text)
if data.get("type") == "ping":
continue
await rate_limit(r, "ws:reply:" + host, 120)
turn = data.get("turn_id", "")
if data.get("type") != "reply" or await r.get(f"hn:inflight:{host}:{turn}") != session:
raise ValueError("unsolicited reply")
envelope = data["envelope"]
verified(envelope, public)
if envelope["host_id"] != host or envelope["session_id"] != session:
raise ValueError("wrong reply destination")
if internal:
await admission(host,owner,generation,turn=turn,session=session,expected_fp=fp)
await r.publish("hn:replies", json.dumps(data))
tasks = [asyncio.create_task(x()) for x in (downstream, heartbeat, upstream)]
done, _ = await asyncio.wait(tasks, return_when=asyncio.FIRST_COMPLETED)
for task in done:
task.result()
except (WebSocketDisconnect, asyncio.TimeoutError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await ws.close(1008)
except Exception:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await ws.close(1011)
finally:
active.discard(session)
for task in tasks:
task.cancel()
await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
if pub:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await pub.aclose()
if presence:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await compare_delete(r, "hn:online:" + host, presence)
return app