fix(work): fence repeated approval intents and audit state changes atomically

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ex_tianzy
2026-11-17 15:21:54 +08:00
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commit 75c609ded6
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@@ -35,3 +35,7 @@ approval_worker.py使用专用单线程及该线程独享的数据库连接,
测试XML:deployable/build-support/approval-integration-20261117.xml。成对源码可通过HAINUO_APPROVAL_PC_SOURCE指定客户端仓库根目录;缺少时明确skip,不能将缺少跨仓执行当通过。独立PostgreSQL用例因未提供测试地址仍跳过;完整服务重启、SDK三秒响应、手机UI显示及真实平台回调需后续隔离环境验收。不能据此标记C201—C204全部完成或可上线。
最终本轮ECS/联合回归100项通过、1项跳过,客户端62项通过(合计162通过、1跳过);详细范围与复现见APPROVAL_ACCEPTANCE_LOCAL_20261117.md。没有提交、推送、部署或出包。
后续M6本地增量:用户暂停手机现场测试后,明确继续M6开发。本轮补C207最小审计、事务失败不放行、默认关闭的保留/清理策略及独立PostgreSQL竞争用例。组合回归192通过2跳过;清理游标最终调整专项另核。详见M6_AUDIT_RETENTION_20261117.md。本轮代码未部署,不能将新审计能力写成现网已启用。
后续独立安全复核与真实PG验证:复现并修复同任务换操作ID重复申请、确认目标不明确/被截断两类问题。隔离本机PostgreSQL 17.7下执行4/16连接竞争、决定冲突、真实SQL审计失败回滚及不同ID同意图竞争,临时实例已停止。最终组合205项通过0跳过,取代本轮“PG缺地址”的未验证状态,但不代表ECS现场或手机验收。详见M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md;修复仍是本地未提交源码,未部署。
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# M6审批审计与保留开发记录
日期:2026-11-17。范围:C207及C201至C204的本地回归。手机现场验收继续暂缓,线上服务仍为之前部署的03d34f1,本次没有部署、推送、出包或修改本机已安装Work组件。
## 本轮实现
增加work_approval_audit_v1,记录创建、允许、拒绝、许可消费、过期、取消、卡片绑定、发送结果不明及内容清理。审计写入与对应状态修改使用同一数据库事务;写审计失败即撤回该事务,不下发许可。重复回调/重复消费不会生成第二次决定或消费事件。
审计字段仅含环境/应用、审批引用、任务/本人/设备的作用域摘要、绑定代次、动作摘要、固定动作类别、事件、状态及记录时间。不保存动作请求正文、卡片文案、账号姓名、原始用户/设备ID、访问/刷新令牌或按钮nonce。摘要是关联标识,不宣称不可重识别。审计中的consumed仅代表执行许可已消费,不代表业务已成功;业务结果仍由原任务和操作记录核对。
没有新增公开的审计查询、任意SQL或管理员执行接口;无效回调在原校验边界拒绝,本轮未增加未经验证操作者的身份审计。
## 保留与清理候选
| 配置 | 候选默认 | 行为 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED | false | 未评审前不启用后台清理 |
| HN_APPROVAL_PAYLOAD_RETENTION_DAYS | 30 | 已关闭审批的加密动作/文案/nonce及对应密钥引用到期后清空 |
| HN_APPROVAL_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS | 90 | 已清理审批的过期审计事件有限删除 |
30/90天只是研发候选值,应按团队正式留存要求评审,不作为公司合规期限。要求1 <= 内容保留天数 <= 审计保留天数 <= 365;启用清理还要求审批功能已开启。现有部署配置未被修改,部署脚本也未新增自动开启清理的参数。
只选择当前应用/环境内rejected、expired、cancelled、consumed审批;pending/approved不清。consumed但原任务仍inflight、unknown或已查不到任务时不清,保留恢复核对材料。使用游标分批扫描,避免待核对任务挡住其他可清项;每批最多20项,有本轮耗时预算,真正变更前再持有本人锁重读状态。
不删除审批/操作防重放记录,不改状态回pending,不删除callback发送意图/回执,不碰用户原稿、附件或任务目录。清理完成后同操作仍返回原关闭状态,不能重新取得执行许可。清理是数据库字段更新,不承诺底层磁盘备份或历史数据库页物理抹除。
## 测试与证据
组合针对性回归192项通过、2项跳过;包括审批闭环、设备认证、卡片、交付、部署和身份发现。跳过的2项均需独立PostgreSQL测试地址:原授权/绑定测试,以及本轮新增的审批并发测试。本轮未连接生产数据库或真实平台业务写接口。
新增审计/清理用例覆盖:字段最小化、重复决定去重、清理后重放拒绝、活跃审批不清、环境隔离、审计失败消费回滚、配置限制以及业务结果未知的consumed保留。最终游标修订后另跑该专项,结果见build-support/m6-retention-final-20261117.xml;组合记录为build-support/m6-audit-retention-20261117.xml,两批不能重复累计为功能完成数。
tests/test_approval_postgres.py已准备独立随机schema的真实数据库竞争测试:同审批并发允许/拒绝、四连接竞争消费、重开连接后再次消费及审计决定唯一。仅显式设置HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL才运行,凭据不放命令行/交付说明;只建和清理本次随机测试schema,不使用现网配置。没有测试地址,不能将跳过写作通过。
## M6仍待完成
1. 独立安全复核:回调来源、操作者/卡片/nonce、任务与代次,以及“模型改ID”对重复请求的影响。
2. 独立PostgreSQL执行新旧竞争用例,测试锁等待/连接重建和事务失败,不只验证SQLite。
3. 真实手机允许/拒绝、超时/重复点击、客户端停止/失联后的旧卡片,按用户恢复验收的时间安排。
4. 应用SDK三秒回调时限及正式部署回滚;桌面主dashboard候选版本另行核对。
5. 审计留存参数评审、受控运维查询与释放策略。审计/清理代码完成不代表C207已验收或整个M6已完成。
后续更新:用户明确要求安全复核与PostgreSQL验证后,已在独立本机PostgreSQL 17.7补跑原跳过用例,并新增对抗修复;最终205通过0跳过,临时实例已停止。测试与剩余边界以M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md为准。这里记录的192通过2跳过是前一批历史结果,不再作为最新结果。
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# M6修复测试环境升级
对象:ecs-fd74。父计划/home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-20261117已由用户确认三服务candidate、connector/router healthy及longconn platform_connected=yes;最后已部署源码为03d34f1。新计划使用/home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117,不能改用更早的work计划。
## 修复内容与证据
- 同任务同动作意图不能通过换operation_id及自动日历幂等键重新申请;真正不同动作可另行待确认。
- 确认卡显示具体资源路径,超长目标拒绝,不静默截断。
- 申请/决定/消费/关闭等事件增加最小审计,和状态变更处于同一事务。旧审批的历史事件不伪造补录。
- 保留与清理逻辑已实现,但本次候选显式HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED=false,不删除既有审批内容或记录。手机现场测试继续暂缓。
205项核心组合回归通过,包含本机独立PostgreSQL 17.7的4/16连接竞争、SQL审计报错回滚和不同ID同意图竞争,0跳过。升级脚本修改后71项部署回归通过,包含从已启用审批的父计划再次升级及回滚;两批存在重叠,不能合算为276个不同功能验收。来源记录见M6_SECURITY_REVIEW_POSTGRES_20261117.md。
2026-11-17准备时本机到10.77.81.160的443请求超时,不能据此判定ECS服务故障;部署由用户在现有ECS shell执行,脚本会先核对实际镜像和父计划。此文档不表示升级已发生。
## 新候选准备与切换
先按交付命令fetch测试分支并用固定提交创建独立worktree:/home/cnooc/ecs-relay-approvals-m6-fix-20261117。下面步骤在该worktree内执行:
```bash
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py state \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-20261117
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py prepare-update \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-20261117 \
--output /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 \
--enable-remote-approvals \
--callback-identity /home/cnooc/hainuo-approval-callback-20261117.json
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py build \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py activate \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 \
--client-v2-ready
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py state \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117
```
复用现有私有callback identity文件,不需再次输入/复制令牌。新目录若已存在停止,不自动删除、覆盖或重建。prepare/build不切换服务,activate仅定向重建原connector/router/longconn。各角色分别复用当前运行镜像作基础,不在线拉依赖,不启动第二个机器人连接。
保留数据库、材料、绑定和keyring;准备目录包含私有配置,禁止贴回或提交Git。启动会新增审计/保留元数据表,但清理开关为false,不做旧数据清理。首次启动时旧审批后续事件可能标为unknown类别,不据此编造历史created事件。
## 核对及回滚
输出应包含connector/router candidate running healthy、longconn candidate running及platform_connected observed=yes。SDK连接信号延迟时再次只读state,不重复activate。失败可能部分切换,先state查看,不自动删除数据或回退数据库。
回滚前停止进行中的审批任务,然后在本次新worktree执行:
```bash
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py rollback \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117 \
--stop-broker-use
sudo python3 deployable/scripts/broker_deploy.py state \
--plan /home/cnooc/hainuo-broker-approvals-m6-fix-20261117
```
仅恢复父计划三服务镜像和配置,不回退绑定、OAuth刷新数据或数据库,不移除新增表。此回滚应保留父计划已有审批功能,不回到最早未启用审批的环境。--stop-broker-use是操作者已停止任务的声明,脚本不会代停电脑或撤销已发生业务动作。
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# M6安全复核与PostgreSQL并发验证
日期:2026-11-17。对象:feat/approval-foundation-local-20261117工作树中未提交的M6审计与审批增量,基于03d34f1。此处“独立复核”指从功能流程之外按对抗场景重新检查,不是另一位团队验收人的签字或第三方测评。
## 结论
复现并修复两类问题,三项初始负向检查均从失败转为通过。最终组合回归205项通过,0失败、0跳过。数据库相关用例在真实PostgreSQL 17.7执行,未再以缺测试地址跳过。
修改仅在本地源码,未提交/推送、未部署到ECS、未改变已安装客户端或清理开关。手机现场验收继续暂缓。当前已部署03d34f1不包含本轮修复,不能将本报告当作现网升级回执。
## 复核发现及修复
| 编号 | 初始可复现行为 | 影响与修复 | 回归结果 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| R1 | 原审批拒绝后,换operation_id并随之更换客户端自动生成的日历idempotency_key,同一动作可再次申请成功并生成新审批。 | 没有证明能不经批准直接执行,但可绕开原拒绝反复发卡。新增同一可信任务内的动作意图校验,覆盖等待、拒绝、过期及已消费的原申请;更换操作ID不能抹掉原决定。 | pending、rejected、consumed下换ID均拒绝;同ID换参数拒绝;真正不同的新动作仍可待确认;PostgreSQL两连接同动作不同ID竞争只建一条。 |
| R2 | 确认卡只显示路径最后一段,两个不同日历都显示events;长资源标识静默截断。 | 用户不能判断真正目标。改为显示完整资源相对路径,保留日历/文件/成员等对象标识。超过300字符的目标直接拒绝,不能截断隐藏差异。 | 两个不同日历文案可区分;过长目标拒绝。 |
R1保留完整operation_digest用于许可消费时逐字节核对。意图规范化仅去除已经核实为客户端按owner和operation_id生成的日历幂等键;不任意忽略业务参数。身份来源、请求正文、nonce、真正操作者及卡片校验均保留。
相同动作只能在同一个任务内复用原审批,不允许模型换ID重新发卡;用户明确发起的新任务是新的授权范围。每任务最多50个不同审批意图,超过预算停止。旧加密内容不可校验时拒绝新申请,而不是猜测放行。
## 复核边界
- 平台来源:只接所选长连接的内部认证通道;核对应用、租户、Verification Token、事件时效及回调类型。不把action.value中的身份或event.token更新凭据当来源证明。
- 决定归属:操作者、私聊、原卡片、随机nonce、本人设备、绑定代次、原task及动作摘要都要匹配。错误应用/租户/用户/卡片、旧任务和旧绑定不能决定。
- 单次许可:决定、消费和审计在数据库事务中执行,按本人锁串行化;已关闭审批不能复活。重投只返回已有事实,未知结果不重新执行。
- 内容与日志:审计不保存正文或token;动作类别固定。清理默认关闭,不删除活跃或结果未知任务所需内容,保留防重放记录;清理不构成物理擦除承诺。
- 恢复:停止控制取实际Agent,许可返回后再核对停止/绑定。许可consumed不宣称业务成功,网络中断不承诺撤销已有外部请求。
## 真实PostgreSQL验证
从官方EDB HTTPS地址获取便携PostgreSQL 17.7,解包到D盘测试目录,不安装Windows服务。每轮创建独立数据目录、随机密码、本机随机端口,仅监听127.0.0.1。测试数据库为合成专用hainuo_m6_test,测试表位于随机schema;没有使用任何生产DSN、应用密钥或真实业务记录。
数据库并发用例用Barrier同时放行独立连接,不是单连接顺序调用:
1. 两连接竞争允许/拒绝,只有一个最终决定;覆盖自然竞争、预先允许及预先拒绝三种情况。
2. 分别4和16连接竞争同一许可;允许时恰好一个execute=true,拒绝时全部false。
3. 重开数据库连接后再次消费仍为false,原决定的审计事件保持唯一。
4. 用PostgreSQL真实触发器让consumed审计INSERT报错,确认前面的状态UPDATE随同事务回滚,之后移除合成故障再按正常规则竞争。
5. 两连接同时以不同操作ID申请同一动作,只建立一个审批,另一个拒绝。
6. 原有PostgreSQL OAuth/绑定代次回归真实执行,不再跳过。
以上为6个参数化审批用例及1个授权/绑定用例;其他198项包含合成平台接口、SQLite应用链路、安全负向、卡片、部署与身份发现回归,不把205项都声称为PostgreSQL端到端业务实测。
初轮针对性验证12项通过。完整回归曾出现1个旧清理测试失败:它在清空原动作后,仍在同任务中申请新动作,与“无法校验旧意图则拒绝”的新保护冲突。调整为清理前创建活跃审批来验证不误清,未放宽正式校验。最终完整重跑205项全部通过。
## 证据和复现
最终XML:build-support/m6-independent-review-pg-final-20261117.xml。包含205项结果及耗时,未通过数与跳过数均为0。前序针对性XML:build-support/m6-postgres-20261117.xml。成对客户端源码仍通过HAINUO_APPROVAL_PC_SOURCE定位,缺少时不能宣称联合通过。
本地临时数据库的启动/运行/停止由工作区outputs/install-1087b-20261117/run_isolated_pg_tests.py完成;运行回执pg-test-receipt.json不含密码。下载来源与ZIP SHA256在D盘postgres-runtime/runtime-receipt.json,临时数据目录保留供复查,明文临时密码文件已移除。
部署仓库deployable目录的复现选择器:
```text
tests/test_approval_postgres.py
tests/test_approval_security_review.py
tests/test_approval_audit.py
tests/test_approval_integration.py
tests/test_task_delivery.py
tests/test_task_cards.py
tests/test_credential_api.py
tests/test_broker_deploy.py
tests/test_approval_identity.py
```
PostgreSQL测试只读取明确指定的HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL。测试schema名称由代码固定前缀加随机十六进制组成,清理仅作用于该schema,不读取现网配置。最终运行后pg_ctl已停止该独立测试实例。
## 尚不能据此放行的事项
- 真实手机点击、私有化SDK三秒回调时限,以及ECS ARM64与现场PostgreSQL版本的整链路行为仍未验收;Windows本地PostgreSQL通过不代替这些事实。
- 真实服务器在提交中途退出、平台业务回执真实丢失、数据库网络分区等仍需要独立环境故障注入;当前证明是账本事务、并发和合成失联行为。
- 当前审批执行闸门覆盖Work API边界,不是任意execute_code/终端工具的沙箱。M2/M8仍需完成所有工具统一风险规则与外部材料指令隔离,不能宣称整个客户端已安全放行。
- 团队仍需另一位具备权限的工程师复核补丁并验收;本轮没有合并master或部署修复。M6整体保持待验收。
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@@ -101,3 +101,6 @@ class ApprovalAPI:
await self.worker.call('close_unavailable')
for approval_id in await self.worker.call('cards_to_send'):self._schedule('send',approval_id)
for approval_id in await self.worker.call('cards_to_close'):self._schedule('close',approval_id)
if self.auth.s.approval_retention_enabled:
await self.worker.call('maintain_retention',self.auth.s.approval_payload_retention_days,
self.auth.s.approval_audit_retention_days)
+40
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
"""Minimal approval audit; no action bodies, tokens, names or card text."""
import hashlib
from .crypto import canonical
EVENTS={'created','approved','rejected','consumed','expired','cancelled','card_bound',
'card_send_unknown','payload_purged'}
STATES={'pending','approved','rejected','consumed','expired','cancelled'}
ACTION_CLASSES={'work_api_read','work_api_write','work_api_delete','unknown'}
class ApprovalAudit:
def __init__(self,db,clock):
self.db,self.clock=db,clock
with db:
db.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS work_approval_audit_v1(
event_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,environment TEXT NOT NULL,app_id TEXT NOT NULL,
approval_id TEXT NOT NULL,task_scope TEXT NOT NULL,actor_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
device_scope TEXT NOT NULL,binding_generation BIGINT NOT NULL,
operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,event TEXT NOT NULL,state TEXT NOT NULL,action_class TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL)''')
db.execute('''CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS work_approval_audit_time_v1
ON work_approval_audit_v1(environment,app_id,created_at)''')
def record(self,row,event,action_class=None):
# Caller owns the approval transaction and owner lock. Failure rolls
# back the associated decision/consume instead of losing its audit.
if event not in EVENTS or row['state']not in STATES:raise ValueError('invalid_approval_audit')
scope=[row['environment'],row['app_id']]
if action_class is None:
created=self.db.execute('''SELECT action_class FROM work_approval_audit_v1
WHERE environment=? AND app_id=? AND approval_id=? AND event='created' ''',
(*scope,row['approval_id'])).fetchone()
action_class=created['action_class']if created else'unknown'
if action_class not in ACTION_CLASSES:raise ValueError('invalid_approval_audit_class')
def digest(kind,value):return hashlib.sha256(canonical([*scope,kind,value])).hexdigest()
key=digest('audit',[row['approval_id'],event])
self.db.execute('''INSERT INTO work_approval_audit_v1 VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING''',(key,*scope,row['approval_id'],digest('task',row['task_id']),
digest('actor',row['owner']),digest('device',row['host_id']),row['binding_generation'],
row['operation_digest'],event,row['state'],action_class,self.clock()))
+2 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ def describe_action(action):
if isinstance(action['body'].get(key),str)and action['body'][key].strip()),'')
if any(ord(char)<32 for char in subject):subject=''
summary=verb+label+'中的指定数据'+(':'+subject if subject else'')
resource=parts[-1][:100]
resource='/'.join(parts[4:])
if len(resource)>300:raise ApprovalError('approval_target_display_budget_exceeded')
impact=('本次是查询,但该接口尚未列入自动放行范围。'if method=='GET'else
'可能修改平台数据或触发通知;已经发生的操作不能保证自动撤销。')
if method=='DELETE':impact='会删除指定数据或移除关联,可能影响其他人,且不一定能够恢复。'
+85 -4
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import re
import secrets
import time
from .crypto import canonical
from .approval_audit import ApprovalAudit
class ApprovalError(ValueError):
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
self.state,self.db,self.keyring,self.clock=state,state.db,keyring,clock
self.enforce_execution_state=enforce_execution_state
self._sweep_after=''
self._retention_after=''
with self.db:
self.db.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS work_approvals_v3(
approval_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,environment TEXT NOT NULL,app_id TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -63,6 +65,9 @@ class ApprovalStore:
updated_at DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL)''')
self.db.execute('''CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS work_approvals_expiry_v3
ON work_approvals_v3(environment,app_id,state,expires_at)''')
self.db.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS work_approval_retention_v1(
approval_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,purged_at DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL)''')
self.audit=ApprovalAudit(self.db,self.clock)
def _task(self,task_id,owner,host,generation):
if type(generation)is not int or generation<1:
@@ -83,6 +88,21 @@ class ApprovalStore:
return canonical(['work-approval-v3',*[row[k]for k in ('environment','app_id','task_id',
'owner','host_id','binding_generation','operation_id','operation_digest','approval_id')]])
@staticmethod
def _intent(action,owner,operation_id):
normalized=json.loads(json.dumps(action,sort_keys=True,ensure_ascii=True,allow_nan=False))
# The calendar key is generated by our PC boundary from owner+op ID;
# changing that generated key must not turn a denied action into a new
# business intent. No arbitrary caller field is discarded otherwise.
if (normalized.get('kind')=='work-api-v1'and normalized.get('method')=='POST'
and isinstance(normalized.get('path'),str)
and re.fullmatch(r'/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/[A-Za-z0-9_.@!:$-]+/events',normalized['path'])
and isinstance(normalized.get('params'),dict)):
expected=hashlib.sha256(canonical([owner,operation_id])).hexdigest()
if normalized['params'].get('idempotency_key')==expected:
normalized['params'].pop('idempotency_key')
return hashlib.sha256(canonical(normalized)).hexdigest()
def _row(self,approval_id):
if not isinstance(approval_id,str)or not re.fullmatch(r'apr_[a-f0-9]{64}',approval_id):
raise ApprovalError('invalid_approval_reference')
@@ -96,6 +116,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='expired',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')",
(self.clock(),row['approval_id']))
row=self._row(row['approval_id'])
self.audit.record(row,'expired')
return row
@staticmethod
@@ -121,6 +142,20 @@ class ApprovalStore:
if (row['owner'],row['host_id'],row['binding_generation'],row['operation_digest'])!=(owner,host,generation,digest):
raise ApprovalError('operation_identity_conflict')
return self._status(row)
# Scope to the SAME authenticated task. Legitimate subsequent user
# tasks are independent; changing a model-chosen operation ID inside
# this task cannot erase a rejection, expiry or consumed grant.
intent=self._intent(action,owner,operation_id)
previous=self.db.execute('''SELECT * FROM work_approvals_v3
WHERE environment=? AND app_id=? AND task_id=? LIMIT 51''',
(self.state.environment,self.state.app_id,task_id)).fetchall()
if len(previous)>=50:raise ApprovalError('approval_task_budget_exceeded')
for prior in previous:
prior=dict(prior)
if not prior['ciphertext']:raise ApprovalError('approval_intent_unavailable')
original=json.loads(self.keyring.decrypt(prior['key_id'],prior['ciphertext'],self._aad(prior)))
if hmac.compare_digest(intent,self._intent(original['action'],prior['owner'],prior['operation_id'])):
raise ApprovalError('approval_intent_already_registered')
nonce=secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
row={'approval_id':approval_id,'environment':task['environment'],'app_id':task['app_id'],
'task_id':task_id,'owner':owner,'host_id':host,'binding_generation':generation,
@@ -131,6 +166,9 @@ class ApprovalStore:
self.db.execute('INSERT INTO work_approvals_v3 VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',
(approval_id,row['environment'],row['app_id'],task_id,owner,host,generation,operation_id,digest,
hashlib.sha256(nonce.encode()).hexdigest(),key,cipher,'','pending',expires,self.clock()))
action_class=('work_api_delete'if action.get('method')=='DELETE'else
'work_api_read'if action.get('method')=='GET'else'work_api_write')if action.get('kind')=='work-api-v1'else'unknown'
self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'created',action_class)
return self._status(self._row(approval_id))
def card_material(self,approval_id):
@@ -152,6 +190,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
task=self.state.task(row['task_id'])
if row['state']in {'pending','approved'}and(not self.state.task_current(task)or task['status']!='inflight'or self._execution_closed(row['task_id'])):
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='cancelled',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=?",(self.clock(),approval_id))
self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'cancelled')
if not self.db.execute('SELECT approval_id FROM work_approval_card_outbox_v1 WHERE approval_id=?',(approval_id,)).fetchone():
raise ApprovalError('approval_send_intent_required')
if row['card_message_id']not in ('',message_id):raise ApprovalError('approval_card_conflict')
@@ -159,6 +198,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
(message_id,self.clock(),approval_id))
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approval_card_outbox_v1 SET state='sent',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=?",
(self.clock(),approval_id))
self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'card_bound')
def claim_card(self,approval_id):
"""Persist send intent before network I/O; lost receipt is not resendable."""
@@ -174,8 +214,9 @@ class ApprovalStore:
def card_send_unknown(self,approval_id):
with self.db:
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approval_card_outbox_v1 SET state='unknown',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='sending'",
(self.clock(),approval_id))
changed=self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approval_card_outbox_v1 SET state='unknown',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='sending'",
(self.clock(),approval_id)).rowcount
if changed:self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'card_send_unknown')
def close_unavailable(self,limit=100):
"""Future bounded maintenance: expiry or invalid task never grants consent."""
@@ -199,6 +240,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')",
(state,self.clock(),row['approval_id']))
closed.append({'approval_id':row['approval_id'],'state':state})
self.audit.record(self._row(row['approval_id']),state)
self._sweep_after=candidate['approval_id']
return closed
@@ -269,6 +311,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
(row['environment'],row['app_id'],decision.event_id,row['approval_id'],decision.event_digest,self.clock()))
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='pending'",
(target,self.clock(),row['approval_id']))
self.audit.record(self._row(row['approval_id']),target)
return self._status(self._row(row['approval_id']))
def status(self,approval_id,task_id,owner,host,generation,operation_digest):
@@ -292,6 +335,7 @@ class ApprovalStore:
changed=self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='consumed',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state='approved'",
(self.clock(),approval_id)).rowcount
if changed!=1:return {**self._status(self._row(approval_id)),'execute':False}
self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'consumed')
return {**self._status(self._row(approval_id)),'execute':True,'action':material['action']}
def cancel(self,approval_id,task_id,owner,host,generation):
@@ -299,6 +343,43 @@ class ApprovalStore:
self.state._owner_lock(owner);row=self._row(approval_id)
self._task(task_id,owner,host,generation)
if (row['task_id'],row['owner'],row['host_id'],row['binding_generation'])!=(task_id,owner,host,generation):raise ApprovalError('approval_identity_conflict')
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='cancelled',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')",
(self.clock(),approval_id))
changed=self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET state='cancelled',updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=? AND state IN ('pending','approved')",
(self.clock(),approval_id)).rowcount
if changed:self.audit.record(self._row(approval_id),'cancelled')
return self._status(self._row(approval_id))
def maintain_retention(self,payload_days=30,audit_days=90,limit=10):
"""Prune CLOSED payloads/audit only. Durable tombstones fence replay."""
if (type(payload_days)is not int or type(audit_days)is not int
or not 1<=payload_days<=audit_days<=365 or type(limit)is not int or not 1<=limit<=20):
raise ApprovalError('invalid_approval_retention')
cutoff=self.clock()-payload_days*86400
rows=self.db.execute('''SELECT approval_id FROM work_approvals_v3 a WHERE environment=? AND app_id=?
AND state IN ('rejected','expired','cancelled','consumed') AND updated_at<?
AND approval_id>?
AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM work_approval_retention_v1 r WHERE r.approval_id=a.approval_id)
ORDER BY approval_id LIMIT ?''',(self.state.environment,self.state.app_id,cutoff,self._retention_after,limit)).fetchall()
if not rows:self._retention_after=''
purged=0;started=time.monotonic()
for item in rows:
if time.monotonic()-started>.5:break
self._retention_after=item['approval_id']
with self.db:
row=self._row(item['approval_id']);self.state._owner_lock(row['owner']);row=self._row(row['approval_id'])
if row['state']not in {'rejected','expired','cancelled','consumed'}or row['updated_at']>=cutoff:continue
if row['state']=='consumed':
task=self.state.task(row['task_id'])
if not task or task['status']in {'inflight','unknown'}:continue
marked=self.db.execute('INSERT INTO work_approval_retention_v1 VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING',
(row['approval_id'],self.clock())).rowcount
if not marked:continue
self.db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET ciphertext='',key_id='',nonce_digest='' WHERE approval_id=?",(row['approval_id'],))
self.audit.record(row,'payload_purged');purged+=1
# Audit removal is bounded too; approval and operation tombstones stay.
with self.db:
removed=self.db.execute('''DELETE FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event_key IN (
SELECT x.event_key FROM work_approval_audit_v1 x JOIN work_approval_retention_v1 r
ON r.approval_id=x.approval_id WHERE x.environment=? AND x.app_id=? AND x.created_at<?
ORDER BY x.created_at LIMIT ?)''',
(self.state.environment,self.state.app_id,self.clock()-audit_days*86400,limit)).rowcount
return {'payloads_purged':purged,'audit_events_removed':removed,'tombstones_preserved':True}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ class ApprovalWorker:
async def call(self,method,*args):
allowed={'create','status','consume','cancel','decide','card_material','claim_card',
'bind_card','card_send_unknown','close_unavailable','closed_card_receipt',
'mark_card_closed','cards_to_send','cards_to_close'}
'mark_card_closed','cards_to_send','cards_to_close','maintain_retention'}
if method not in allowed:raise ApprovalError('unsupported_approval_operation')
try:await asyncio.wait_for(self.slots.acquire(),timeout=.05)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:raise ApprovalError('approval_temporarily_unavailable')from None
+7
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
work_task_cards_enabled: bool = False
work_remote_approvals_enabled: bool = False
feishu_tenant_key: str = ''
approval_retention_enabled: bool = False
approval_payload_retention_days: int = 30
approval_audit_retention_days: int = 90
work_file_max_bytes: int = 10*1024*1024
work_file_batch_limit: int = 20
work_file_retention: int = 86400
@@ -59,6 +62,10 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_runtime(self):
if not 1<=self.approval_payload_retention_days<=self.approval_audit_retention_days<=365:
raise ValueError('approval retention requires 1 <= payload days <= audit days <= 365')
if self.approval_retention_enabled and not self.work_remote_approvals_enabled:
raise ValueError('approval retention requires remote approvals')
if self.work_remote_approvals_enabled:
if (self.credential_mode!='broker'or self.feishu_event_source!='longconn'
or not self.feishu_enabled or not self.feishu_verification_token
+6 -4
View File
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ def validate_overlay(base, merged, candidate, router_key_required=True, approval
env = new[name]["environment"]
for key, value in old[name].get("environment", {}).items():
if key not in {"HN_CREDENTIAL_MODE","HN_ROUTER_ADMISSION_SECRET","HN_CREDENTIAL_KEYRING_FILE",
"HN_CREDENTIAL_PERMISSION_PROFILES","HN_CONNECTOR_INTERNAL_URL","HN_FEISHU_APP_ID","HN_OAUTH_ENABLED","HN_WORK_FILES_ENABLED","HN_WORK_TASK_CARDS_ENABLED","HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED","HN_FEISHU_TENANT_KEY","HN_FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN"}:
"HN_CREDENTIAL_PERMISSION_PROFILES","HN_CONNECTOR_INTERNAL_URL","HN_FEISHU_APP_ID","HN_OAUTH_ENABLED","HN_WORK_FILES_ENABLED","HN_WORK_TASK_CARDS_ENABLED","HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED","HN_FEISHU_TENANT_KEY","HN_FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN","HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED"}:
if env.get(key) != value:
raise DeployError("existing environment changed: "+key)
old_volumes = {v["target"]:v for v in old[name].get("volumes", [])}
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ def validate_overlay(base, merged, candidate, router_key_required=True, approval
# namespace rather than silently converting it to production. All modes still
# require PostgreSQL and HTTPS/WSS for this existing-server migration.
require_platform(env)
approval_keys={'HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED','HN_FEISHU_TENANT_KEY','HN_FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN'}
approval_keys={'HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED','HN_FEISHU_TENANT_KEY','HN_FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN','HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED'}
for name in ('connector','router'):
before=old[name].get('environment',{});after=new[name]['environment']
if name=='connector'and approval_plan and approval_plan.get('remote_approvals_managed'):
@@ -454,9 +454,11 @@ def prepare_update(args):
shared={'HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED':'true',
'HN_FEISHU_TENANT_KEY':approval_identity['tenant_key'],
'HN_FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN':approval_identity['verification_token']}
plan['connector_approval_environment']=shared
# Retention remains disabled for this candidate even if a deployment
# environment contains an unrelated setting. Enabling needs review.
plan['connector_approval_environment']={**shared,'HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED':'false'}
plan['longconn_approval_environment']={**shared,'HN_CREDENTIAL_MODE':'broker'}
overlay['services']['connector']['environment'].update(shared)
overlay['services']['connector']['environment'].update(plan['connector_approval_environment'])
overlay['services']['connector']['environment']['HN_WORK_TASK_CARDS_ENABLED']='true'
plan['work_task_cards_enabled']=True
original_long=live['services']['longconn']
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
"""M6 audit and cleanup on temporary encrypted approval stores only."""
import json
import pytest
from test_credential_api import env
from test_approval_integration import approval_env,pair
from relay.approval_store import ApprovalStore,ApprovalError
async def test_audit_is_minimal_and_repeated_decisions_do_not_duplicate(pair):
p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();response,body=await p['click']()
await job
e=p['env'];await e['client'].post('/internal/approval-callback',json=body,
headers={'X-Internal-Secret':e['settings'].internal_secret})
events=[dict(r)for r in e['store'].db.execute('SELECT * FROM work_approval_audit_v1').fetchall()]
assert {r['event']for r in events}>={'created','card_bound','approved','consumed'}
assert sum(r['event']=='approved'for r in events)==1
assert sum(r['event']=='consumed'for r in events)==1
encoded=json.dumps(events)
for secret in ('ou_a','oc_synthetic','om_source','合成测试','fake-access','verification-synthetic',row['ciphertext']):
assert secret not in encoded
assert all(len(r['actor_scope'])==64 and len(r['device_scope'])==64 for r in events)
assert all(r['action_class']=='work_api_write'for r in events)
async def test_closed_payload_purge_keeps_replay_tombstone_and_active_payload(pair):
p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();await p['click']('deny')
from test_approval_integration import pc_errors
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time()
with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=?',(now-31*86400,))
api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now)
active=api.create('task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,'operation-active',{'kind':'synthetic'},'合成动作','仅测试')
with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=? WHERE approval_id=?',
(now-32*86400,active['approval_id']))
result=api.maintain_retention()
assert result['payloads_purged']==1 and result['tombstones_preserved']
saved=e['store'].db.execute('SELECT * FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()
assert saved['state']=='rejected'and saved['ciphertext']==''and saved['nonce_digest']==''
assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0
status=api.status(row['approval_id'],'task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,row['operation_digest'])
assert status['state']=='rejected'
assert api.consume(row['approval_id'],'task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,row['operation_digest'])['execute']is False
action=json.loads(e['api'].broker.store.keyring.decrypt(row['key_id'],row['ciphertext'],api._aad(row)))['action']
assert api.create('task-approval','ou_a','a'*32,1,'operation-synthetic',action,'同动作','不得重新放行')['state']=='rejected'
# A pre-existing pending approval is not selected even when timestamp is old.
assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0
assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT ciphertext FROM work_approvals_v3 WHERE approval_id=?',
(active['approval_id'],)).fetchone()['ciphertext']
async def test_retention_is_environment_scoped_and_bounded(pair):
p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();await p['click']('deny')
from test_approval_integration import pc_errors
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time()
api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now)
with e['store'].db:
e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=?',(now-100*86400,))
e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approval_audit_v1 SET created_at=?',(now-100*86400,))
result=api.maintain_retention(limit=1)
assert result['audit_events_removed']==1
assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['n']==1
assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approval_callbacks_v1').fetchone()['n']==1
for kwargs in ({'payload_days':0},{'audit_days':366},{'payload_days':91,'audit_days':90},{'limit':100}):
with pytest.raises(ApprovalError):api.maintain_retention(**kwargs)
async def test_audit_write_failure_rolls_back_consume_and_never_sends(pair,monkeypatch):
from relay.approval_audit import ApprovalAudit
from test_approval_integration import pc_errors
original=ApprovalAudit.record
def fail_consume(self,row,event,action_class=None):
if event=='consumed':raise RuntimeError('synthetic audit storage failure')
return original(self,row,event,action_class)
monkeypatch.setattr(ApprovalAudit,'record',fail_consume)
p=pair;job=p['launch']();await p['click']()
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
e=p['env']
assert not p['calls']
assert e['store'].db.execute("SELECT state FROM work_approvals_v3").fetchone()['state']!='consumed'
assert not e['store'].db.execute("SELECT * FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event='consumed'").fetchall()
async def test_retention_never_touches_another_environment(pair):
from test_approval_integration import pc_errors
p=pair;job=p['launch']();await p['click']('deny')
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time()
with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute("UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET environment='development',updated_at=?",(now-100*86400,))
api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now)
assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0
assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT ciphertext FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['ciphertext']
def test_retention_configuration_is_explicit_and_ordered():
from relay.config import Settings
from pydantic import ValidationError
settings=Settings(role='test',environment='test')
assert settings.approval_retention_enabled is False
assert (settings.approval_payload_retention_days,settings.approval_audit_retention_days)==(30,90)
for changes in ({'approval_retention_enabled':True},
{'approval_payload_retention_days':91,'approval_audit_retention_days':90},
{'approval_audit_retention_days':366}):
with pytest.raises(ValidationError):Settings(role='test',environment='test',**changes)
async def test_consumed_but_result_unknown_is_not_purged(pair):
p=pair;job=p['launch']();await p['click']();await job
e=p['env'];now=__import__('time').time()
api=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring,clock=lambda:now)
with e['store'].db:
e['store'].db.execute('UPDATE work_approvals_v3 SET updated_at=?',(now-100*86400,))
e['store'].db.execute("UPDATE work_tasks_v2 SET status='unknown'")
assert api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']==0
assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT ciphertext FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['ciphertext']
with e['store'].db:e['store'].db.execute("UPDATE work_tasks_v2 SET status='completed'")
# Bounded keyset scan wraps on the next maintenance pass.
outcomes=[api.maintain_retention()['payloads_purged']for _ in range(2)]
assert sum(outcomes)==1
+109
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@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
"""Opt-in isolated-schema PostgreSQL race test; never uses production config."""
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import secrets
import time
import threading
import pytest
import psycopg
from psycopg.conninfo import make_conninfo
from relay.store import Store
from relay.binding_state import BindingState
from relay.credential_store import CredentialKeyring
from relay.approval_store import ApprovalStore,VerifiedDecision,ApprovalError
from relay.crypto import canonical
pytestmark=pytest.mark.skipif(not os.environ.get('HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL'),reason='isolated PostgreSQL test URL not supplied')
@pytest.mark.parametrize('winner',['race','allow','deny'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize('consumers',[4,16])
def test_concurrent_postgres_decisions_consumption_and_reopen(tmp_path,winner,consumers):
schema='approval_test_'+secrets.token_hex(10)
target=os.environ['HN_TEST_DATABASE_URL']
control=psycopg.connect(target,autocommit=True)
control.execute('CREATE SCHEMA '+schema)
dsn=make_conninfo(target,options='-c search_path='+schema,connect_timeout=5)
keyring=CredentialKeyring('synthetic',{ 'synthetic':secrets.token_bytes(32)})
connections=[]
def connect():
store=Store(tmp_path/'unused.sqlite',dsn)
store.db.execute("SET lock_timeout TO '2s'")
store.db.execute("SET statement_timeout TO '3s'")
state=BindingState(store,'test','cli_pg_test')
return store,state,ApprovalStore(state,keyring)
try:
store,state,approvals=connect();connections.append(store)
with store.db:
store.db.execute("INSERT INTO devices VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",('a'*32,'synthetic-cert','synthetic-fingerprint','ou_pg',0,1))
state.create_task('pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,'session','worker',time.time()+300,'oc_pg','om_pg_source')
action={'kind':'synthetic','value':'no real side effect'}
item=approvals.create('pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,'pg-operation',action,'合成并发确认','不执行真实业务')
material=approvals.card_material(item['approval_id']);assert approvals.claim_card(item['approval_id'])
approvals.bind_card(item['approval_id'],'om_pg_card')
def make_decision(choice):
fields=dict(environment='test',app_id='cli_pg_test',actor_open_id='ou_pg',chat_id='oc_pg',
card_message_id='om_pg_card',approval_id=item['approval_id'],nonce=material['nonce'],choice=choice)
return VerifiedDecision(**fields,event_id=secrets.token_hex(16),event_digest=hashlib.sha256(canonical(fields)).hexdigest())
if winner!='race':approvals.decide(make_decision(winner))
decision_gate=threading.Barrier(2,timeout=10)
def decide(choice):
connection,_,ledger=connect()
try:
decision_gate.wait()
try:return ledger.decide(make_decision(choice))['state']
except ApprovalError:return 'conflict'
finally:connection.close()
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2)as executor:
decisions=list(executor.map(decide,('allow','deny')))
row=store.db.execute('SELECT state FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()
assert row['state']in {'approved','rejected'}and decisions.count('conflict')==1
if winner=='allow':
# A real PostgreSQL statement error must roll back the earlier
# consumed UPDATE in the same transaction, not merely hide a reply.
store.db.execute("""CREATE FUNCTION fail_approval_audit() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$
BEGIN IF NEW.event='consumed' THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'synthetic audit storage failure';
END IF; RETURN NEW; END $$""")
store.db.execute('''CREATE TRIGGER synthetic_audit_failure BEFORE INSERT ON work_approval_audit_v1
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION fail_approval_audit()''')
with pytest.raises(psycopg.Error):
approvals.consume(item['approval_id'],'pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,item['operation_digest'])
assert store.db.execute('SELECT state FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['state']=='approved'
assert not store.db.execute("SELECT * FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event='consumed'").fetchall()
store.db.execute('DROP TRIGGER synthetic_audit_failure ON work_approval_audit_v1')
store.db.execute('DROP FUNCTION fail_approval_audit()')
consume_gate=threading.Barrier(consumers,timeout=20)
def consume(_):
connection,_,ledger=connect()
try:
consume_gate.wait()
return ledger.consume(item['approval_id'],'pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,item['operation_digest'])['execute']
finally:connection.close()
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=consumers)as executor:executed=list(executor.map(consume,range(consumers)))
assert sum(executed)==(1 if row['state']=='approved'else 0)
restored,_,ledger=connect();connections.append(restored)
assert ledger.consume(item['approval_id'],'pg-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,item['operation_digest'])['execute']is False
assert store.db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approval_audit_v1 WHERE event IN ('approved','rejected')").fetchone()['n']==1
state.create_task('pg-intent-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,'session','worker',time.time()+300,'oc_pg','om_pg_intent')
intent_gate=threading.Barrier(2,timeout=10)
def create_same_intent(operation):
connection,_,ledger=connect()
try:
intent_gate.wait()
try:
ledger.create('pg-intent-task','ou_pg','a'*32,1,operation,action,'相同合成动作','不执行真实业务')
return 'created'
except ApprovalError:return 'conflict'
finally:connection.close()
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2)as executor:
outcomes=list(executor.map(create_same_intent,('pg-intent-one','pg-intent-two')))
assert outcomes.count('created')==1 and outcomes.count('conflict')==1
assert store.db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approvals_v3 WHERE task_id='pg-intent-task'").fetchone()['n']==1
finally:
for connection in connections:connection.close()
# The unique generated test schema is the only deletion target.
control.execute('DROP SCHEMA '+schema+' CASCADE');control.close()
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
"""Adversarial M6 checks, no real platform operations."""
import hashlib
import json
import pytest
from test_credential_api import env,wire
from test_approval_integration import approval_env,pair,pc_errors
from relay.approval_store import ApprovalStore,ApprovalError
from relay.approval_policy import describe_action
from relay.crypto import canonical
@pytest.mark.parametrize('choice',[None,'deny','allow'])
async def test_same_intent_cannot_get_new_card_by_changing_operation_id(pair,choice):
p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']()
if choice:
await p['click'](choice)
if choice=='deny':
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
else:await job
e=p['env'];ledger=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring)
action=json.loads(ledger.keyring.decrypt(row['key_id'],row['ciphertext'],ledger._aad(row)))['action']
other='new-operation-id'
action['params']['idempotency_key']=hashlib.sha256(canonical(['ou_a',other])).hexdigest()
path='/work/v2/approvals/create'
response=await e['client'].post(path,json=wire(e,path,task_id='task-approval',operation_id=other,action=action,ttl=120))
assert response.status_code==409
assert e['store'].db.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM work_approvals_v3').fetchone()['n']==1
assert len(p['calls'])==(1 if choice=='allow'else 0)
if not choice:
p['stop'].set()
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
def test_confirmation_identifies_actual_calendar_not_just_events_suffix():
def action(calendar):return {'kind':'work-api-v1','method':'POST',
'path':'/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/'+calendar+'/events','params':{},'body':{'summary':'同一标题'}}
first=describe_action(action('calendar_a'))
second=describe_action(action('calendar_b'))
assert 'calendar_a'in first[1]and 'calendar_b'in second[1]and first!=second
def test_long_target_is_rejected_instead_of_silently_truncated():
with pytest.raises(ApprovalError):describe_action({'kind':'work-api-v1','method':'DELETE',
'path':'/open-apis/drive/v1/files/'+'x'*400,'params':{},'body':{}})
async def test_changed_action_same_id_rejected_but_distinct_new_action_can_confirm(pair):
p=pair;job=p['launch']();row=await p['card']();await p['click']('deny')
with pytest.raises(pc_errors.WorkError):await job
e=p['env'];ledger=ApprovalStore(e['store'].lifecycle,e['api'].broker.store.keyring)
action=json.loads(ledger.keyring.decrypt(row['key_id'],row['ciphertext'],ledger._aad(row)))['action']
action['body']['summary']='真正不同的合成动作'
path='/work/v2/approvals/create'
same=await e['client'].post(path,json=wire(e,path,task_id='task-approval',
operation_id='operation-synthetic',action=action,ttl=120))
assert same.status_code==409
other='distinct-operation'
action['params']['idempotency_key']=hashlib.sha256(canonical(['ou_a',other])).hexdigest()
distinct=await e['client'].post(path,json=wire(e,path,task_id='task-approval',
operation_id=other,action=action,ttl=120))
assert distinct.status_code==200 and distinct.json()['state']=='pending'
assert not p['calls']
+23
View File
@@ -698,12 +698,35 @@ def test_approval_update_preserves_runtime_ancestry_and_original_longconn_rollba
assert plan['longconn_base_image']==scenario['roles']['longconn']['image']
assert candidate['services']['longconn']['image']!=candidate['services']['connector']['image']
assert candidate['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_CREDENTIAL_MODE']=='broker'
assert candidate['services']['connector']['environment']['HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED']=='false'
assert rollback['services']['longconn']['image']==scenario['roles']['longconn']['image']
assert rollback['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_CREDENTIAL_MODE']=='legacy'
assert rollback['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED']=='false'
assert (root/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes()==(Path(args.plan)/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes()
def test_second_approval_update_uses_active_parent_images_and_retains_off(scenario):
args=approval_update(scenario);deploy.prepare_update(args)
root=Path(args.output);parent=deploy.load_plan(root)
connector='sha256:'+'c'*64;longconn='sha256:'+'d'*64
for name in ('connector','router'):scenario['roles'][name]['image']=connector
scenario['roles']['longconn']['image']=longconn
deploy.write_json(root/'candidate.json',{'image':connector,'tag':parent['candidate_image']})
deploy.write_json(root/'candidate-longconn.json',{'image':longconn,'tag':parent['longconn_candidate_image']})
output=root.parent/'approvals-m6-fix'
deploy.prepare_update(argparse.Namespace(plan=str(root),source_root=str(ROOT),output=str(output),
enable_remote_approvals=True,callback_identity=args.callback_identity))
result=deploy.load_plan(output)
candidate=json.loads((output/'compose.broker.json').read_text())
rollback=json.loads((output/'compose.rollback.json').read_text())
assert result['base_image']==connector and result['longconn_base_image']==longconn
assert candidate['services']['connector']['environment']['HN_APPROVAL_RETENTION_ENABLED']=='false'
assert rollback['services']['connector']['image']==connector
assert rollback['services']['longconn']['image']==longconn
assert rollback['services']['longconn']['environment']['HN_WORK_REMOTE_APPROVALS_ENABLED']=='true'
assert (output/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes()==(root/'credential-keyring.json').read_bytes()
def test_approval_runtime_checks_three_roles_and_sdk_without_network(scenario):
args=approval_update(scenario);deploy.prepare_update(args);root=Path(args.output);plan=deploy.load_plan(root)
scenario['calls'].clear();deploy.runtime_check(root,plan)